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Abstract
Does political aﬃrmative action undermine or promote development, and for whom?
We examine Scheduled Areas in India, which reserve political oﬃce for the historically
disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. We apply a new theoretical framework and dataset
of 217,000 villages to evaluate the overall impact of aﬃrmative action on development,
as well as its distributional consequences for minorities and non-minorities. Examining
eﬀects on the world’s largest employment program, the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme, we find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that
there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the
relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find broader improvements in other
pro-poor policies, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Contrary
to the expectations of aﬃrmative action skeptics, our results indicate that aﬃrmative
action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall
development.
Keywords: Aﬃrmative Action, Electoral Quota, Reservation, Scheduled Areas, Scheduled
Tribes, Scheduled Castes, NREGS, PMGSY, Employment
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1 Introduction
Many countries have adopted political aﬃrmative action with the express aim of raising
the voice of marginalized communities in how governments function. This paper asks how
improvements in descriptive representation might impact economic welfare. Studying this
question is of particular import where poor populations rely on large-scale government wel-
fare programs such as in the case of the Benazir Income Support Program in Pakistan that
provides 5.4 million poor women income supplements as a safety net, the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program in the United States that helps 46 million low-income indi-
viduals purchase groceries every month, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (NREGS) in India, the world’s largest employment program that we examine in this
study.
Does descriptive representation achieved through aﬃrmative action deliver improved wel-
fare for marginalized communities, or does restricting representation prove self-defeating in
that it damages the economic prospects of the populations it was designed to politically
empower? We study electoral quotas, an aﬃrmative action policy that directly yields de-
scriptive representation and is implemented in over 100 countries,1 and ask two related, yet
under-explored questions: do electoral quotas improve or hinder development; and how are
the benefits (and costs) of electoral quotas distributed in society?
Prior evidence is mixed and does not oﬀer clear theoretical expectations. Focusing on
minorities explicitly targeted under an electoral quota, some studies, which we review be-
low, show strong positive welfare eﬀects, while others report no improvements. We organize
and extend hypotheses from previous work in a novel theoretical framework that enables an
explicit accounting of how electoral quotas aﬀect the extensive margin of program imple-
mentation (that is, the overall size of the pie) and the intensive margin (the distribution of
the pie) for targeted disadvantaged groups, non-targeted disadvantaged groups, and for the
1See Bird (2014); Long (2019).
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comparatively privileged groups under the status quo. This exercise allows a fuller under-
standing of the trade-oﬀs involved in the implementation of aﬃrmative action policies. A
solidarity hypothesis predicts that shared interests and experiences between minority groups
should lead to positive program spillovers from quota-targeted to non-targeted minorities.
A crowding-out hypothesis predicts that gains for a quota targeted minority will come at
the cost of other groups, particularly non-targeted minorities. And, a performance hypoth-
esis predicts better outcomes for targeted minorities and unchanged outcomes for others,
or, at the very least, negative outcomes for others that do not outweigh gains for targeted
minorities.
This paper examines a large electoral quota in India that brought increased descriptive
representation to well over 100 million citizens. Shortly after Independence from the British
in 1947, the Indian parliament declared certain regions in the country as Scheduled Areas
(SA), a designation linked to the protection of a historically-disadvantaged category of mi-
nority groups, the Scheduled Tribes (ST). From 2000, under the Panchayat Extension to
Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, India’s national parliament implemented a dramatic electoral
quota in Scheduled Areas requiring that all chairperson positions in three tiers of local gov-
ernment councils, as well as at least half the seats on each of those councils, be reserved for
individuals from the Scheduled Tribes.
Why does understanding the impact of this electoral quota matter? First, the quota
has received no systematic quantitative analysis despite the fact that it is present in half
of India’s states and covers nearly half of the territory within those states. Second, the
quota targets ST, who are considered to be among the most economically vulnerable and
politically excluded groups in India. Third, the permanence of the Scheduled Areas quota
is qualitatively diﬀerent from population-based quotas that rotate over time. Scholars have
argued that rotation is an impediment to long-term quota success (Dunning and Nilekani,
2013; Bhavnani, 2009).
Isolating the causal eﬀect of Scheduled Areas is not straightforward. Indeed, comparing
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SA to non-SA using data from the 2001 Indian Census shows that they diﬀer on a number of
dimensions. By employing a geographic regression discontinuity (RD) design similar to Dell
(2010), we absorb variation that correlates with geographic space, allowing for a comparison
of villages lying just on one or the other side of the border between non-Scheduled and
Scheduled Areas. In other words, control (non-Scheduled) villages appear similar to treated
(Scheduled) villages except that in treated areas candidates for local oﬃces are restricted to
ST individuals, whereas in control areas these restrictions are not in place.
We first examine the impacts of Scheduled Areas using data from NREGS, a flagship
federal program in India with an annual cost of approximately US$6 billion. Each year, the
social protection scheme oﬃcially guarantees 100 days of minimum-wage employment for
every rural household in India. We study program delivery to rural populations in 2013, up
to 12 years after the first implementation of PESA. We do this by creating a new dataset
with 217,144 villages that combines oﬃcial NREGS implementation data with an original
spatial dataset of Scheduled Area status. The scale and depth of these data, which permit us
to evaluate both the extensive and intensive margins of program delivery, are a substantial
advance on existing work on aﬃrmative action and economic development.2
Results show that NREGS delivery improves substantially for the targeted minorities
(ST), who receive 24.1 percent more workdays in Scheduled Areas. Improvement appears
to come primarily at the cost of work for non-minorities, who receive 12.5 percent fewer
workdays. We find no evidence that the quota causes a change in employment for the non-
targeted, historically disadvantaged minorities (SC). Our evidence thus oﬀers support for the
crowding out and performance hypotheses, but not for the solidarity hypothesis. Overall,
the results indicate that the delivery of government programs in Scheduled Areas are no
2While Jensenius (2015), Pande (2003), and Das, Mukhopadhyay and Saroy (2017) con-
duct similar exercises, our detailed data help to disaggregate the non-targeted group into
meaningful categories of SC and non-minorities, allowing us to study the causal eﬀect of
reservations on both eﬃciency and redistribution.
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worse than in non-Scheduled Areas.
Are these eﬀects specific to NREGS? We evaluate broader impacts of Scheduled Areas
by examining a second large-scale development scheme as well as outcomes from the 2011
Census. The 2011 Census reveals higher employment for women in Scheduled Areas, par-
ticularly those who are underemployed. Data also show improved provision of public goods
that is likely to benefit disadvantaged communities. We also observe increased rural road
connectivity from the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) village roads program.
These improvements are consistent with the results from NREGS, insofar as they reflect a
higher responsiveness to the needs of marginalized communities.
To what extent are the results we observe the function of an electoral politics mechanism?
We provide four pieces of evidence. First, qualitative evidence from Indian historical studies,
as well as quantitative evidence from the PMGSY program and the Indian Census, show that
villages on opposite sides of the Scheduled and non-Scheduled border were very similar on a
host of dimensions prior to the implementation of PESA between 2000 and 2010. Second, the
quota is most eﬀective where the targeted group is a relatively small proportion of the local
population – where we would expect a quota to have the largest marginal impact, given the
target group’s lower pre-quota bargaining power. Third, the eﬀects of the quota are reduced
in areas of overlap with quotas for state-level ST legislators. Fourth, the impact of the quota
is largest when it constitutes the greatest shock to political representation: that is, following
the first election.
This paper makes theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions. The theoretical con-
tribution is to explicitly lay out hypotheses on the trade-oﬀs of aﬃrmative action on tar-
geted and historically disadvantaged, non-targeted and disadvantaged, and non-targeted and
non-disadvantaged identity-based groups, and combine them into a unified framework. Em-
pirically, our unique data allow us to test these hypothesis in the context of three critical,
village-level data sources – the largest rural employment scheme in the world, a national
rural roads development program, and public goods and economic measures from the census
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of the world’s largest democracy, India. From a policy perspective, all too often policy-
makers and analysts treat parallel pro-poor economic and political eﬀorts in isolation. By
considering their interaction, we hope to advance our understanding of how politics can be
made to work for inclusive development.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we review conflicting findings and draw hypotheses from existing work on
the eﬀects of political aﬃrmative action on government functioning.
2.1 Extensive Margin (Size of the Pie)
Given the same resources and institutional design, do electoral quotes positively or negatively
aﬀect the overall eﬃcacy of government programs? Implementation of government programs
would suﬀer if quota politicians are less competent than non-quota politicians (Jensenius,
2017). Jensenius (2015) presents qualitative evidence that SC quota politicians are viewed
as inexperienced and referred to as “weak”, “ineﬃcient”, and “useless” (p.202). Deshpande
and Weisskopf (2014) document how some oppose aﬃrmative action policies due to a belief
that they result in less qualified individuals and worse performance. Bertrand, Hanna and
Mullainathan (2010) find that students admitted under quotas see an increase in income,
but these gains are more than oﬀset by losses in earnings for individuals displaced by the
quota.
Conversely, implementation could improve if quota politicians work harder for their con-
stituents. Chin and Prakash (2011) report that ST quotas, but not SC quotas, result in
lower levels of overall poverty. Deshpande and Weisskopf (2014) find that a greater propor-
tion of high-level SC/ST employees in the Indian Railways is correlated with both increased
productivity and growth. Evidence also suggests that women exert more eﬀort and outper-
form men when positions of political influence are available to them (Beaman et al., 2010;
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Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013). Das, Mukhopadhyay and Saroy (2017) argue that
in the presence of asymmetric group sizes, aﬃrmative action can improve the eﬃciency of
outcomes. Finally, government performance could remain unchanged if quota politicians
perform no better or worse than non-quota politicians, as Bhavnani and Lee (2018) find for
Indian bureaucrats.
2.2 Intensive Margin (Distribution of the Pie)
We now turn to the impact of aﬃrmative action on targeted and non-targeted historically dis-
advantaged communities, and more privileged communities. While theoretical examinations
predict positive results for targeted minorities, existing research from India on electoral
reservations has found mixed eﬀects. Besley, Pande and Rao (2007), Duflo and Chattopad-
hyay (2004), and Beaman et al. (2010) show that reservations for SC/ST and women improve
the welfare of direct beneficiaries. Other work, such as Dunning and Nilekani (2013) and
Jensenius (2015), find no overall eﬀect of electoral quotas on targeted groups. Unlike our
case, one explanation for weak eﬀects in the literature is the rotating nature of quotas in
these contexts, which limits politicians’ incentives to target benefits along ethnic lines.
We expect targeted minorities to benefit under aﬃrmative action. Less clear is what we
should expect for non-targeted groups. We draw three hypotheses from existing literature
for why gains for targeted minorities may alternatively result in positive, negative, or no
spillovers to other groups.
Solidarity Hypothesis: Non-targeted minorities may experience positive spillovers from
quotas targeting other minorities. Studies have found that minority politicians may carry
intrinsic motivations – absent electoral motivations – to help individuals with whom they
identify (Broockman, 2013; Adida, Davenport and McClendon, 2016; Singh, 2015). They
may also share policy preferences with other minorities: Kaufmann (2003) writes that African
Americans and Latinos in the U.S. “share objective circumstances [and] interests” (2003,
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p.199) and may have a ‘minority group consciousness’. Consistently, Adida, Davenport and
McClendon (2016) show that African Americans respond positively not only to co-ethnic
but also to co-minority (Latino) political cues.
Under this hypothesis, therefore, minority groups not targeted by the quota should also
benefit from improved program implementation. Some evidence from India is consistent
with this prediction: SC reserved councillors increase village expenditures in a manner that
benefits both SC and ST in their village (Palaniswamy and Krishnan, 2012).
These theories are largely silent on the expected eﬀects on non-minorities. While one
can extrapolate that this group will not benefit under this hypothesis because of a lack
of solidarity with targeted minorities, it is unclear if they will be worse oﬀ or remain at
the status quo. As a consequence, there are also no clear predictions on what happens to
outcomes on the extensive margin.
Crowding Out Hypothesis: Gains in descriptive representation for one minority group
may come at the expense of benefits for non-targeted minorities, especially where targeted
and non-targeted minorities are in competition. Meier et al. (2004) examine changes in
representation among African-Americans and Latinos and find that improvements in ad-
ministrative and teaching positions for one group are associated with losses for the other.
Expectations of inter-caste competition and negative spillover eﬀects are captured by Khosla
(2011), who argues that as “diﬀerent castes vie to capture NREGS benefits, they limit the
access of other caste groups” (p.65).
Under this hypothesis, quotas could leave outcomes for non-minorities unchanged es-
pecially if targeted minorities still live under social pressure from non-minorities, or where
non-minorities are not in competition for the same goods. Alternatively, if competition for
resources exists, and if non-minority groups do not retain full control over their distribution,
in a weaker version of the hypothesis, non-minority groups could suﬀer losses.3 Extant evi-
3Studies also indicate that individuals may be willing to forgo economic gains where they
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dence is limited: Jenkins and Manor (2017) note that there is no systematic evidence from
India that asks if participation of ‘non-poor’ in NREGS crowds-out the ‘genuinely poor’ (p.
168). Overall, critics of aﬃrmative action cite concern that negative spillovers will outweigh
any benefits to the targeted group.
Performance Hypothesis: Unlike the previous hypotheses that examined the rela-
tionship between various groups on the basis of solidarity or competition, the performance
hypothesis simply states that improvements for a targeted minority may come without nec-
essarily incurring costs on other groups, if, for instance, quota politicians exert more eﬀort
than non-quota politicians. Beaman et al. (2010) consider the eﬀects of a quota for women
on a non-targeted minority group, Muslims, and find that improved outcomes for women
do not appear to crowd out benefits for Muslims. Iyer and Mani (2012) find that quotas
for women increase reporting of crimes against women but do not appear to aﬀect reporting
for crimes against men. Since the spirit of this hypothesis is to make a claim about the net
eﬀects of the quota, a weaker version of the hypothesis would state that potentially positive
eﬀects on the targeted minority are greater than or equal to any negative spillovers to other
groups.
Table 1: Summary of Predictions
Empirical Implications: Benefits for...
Hypotheses Overall Targeted Minority (ST) Non-Targeted Minority (SC) Non-SC/ST
Solidarity ? ↑ ↑ ¬ ↑
Crowding Out ¬ ↑ ↑ ↓ ¬ ↑
Performance ¬ ↓ ↑ ? ?
might come with social costs under an out-group leader, which could lead non-minority
groups to opt out of competition (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Moﬃtt, 1983). The design of
NREGS, however, makes this unlikely; see Section 3.4.1.
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2.3 Intersecting Identities
We also investigate whether reservations have diﬀerential eﬀects, for women and men, for
several reasons. First, NREGS mandates that one-third of workers be women, and that
women and men be paid equal wages. Dutta et al. (2014) find that 48% of NREGS workers
are women, which is approximately twice the share of women in other casual wage work.
If quotas improve program implementation, then positive eﬀects may be particularly strong
for women.
Second, minority politicians elected under quotas may be more or less responsive to
women. Cassan and Vandewalle (2017) report that high caste women are less politically
active than low caste women, and therefore reservations for women result in more lower caste
women elected to oﬃce. Flipping this argument in our case may suggest that reservations
will encourage greater participation among women.
Alternatively, men may do better where there are ST reservations. If ST are particularly
in need of NREGS work, and bureaucrats are more likely to provide work for men than
women, then gains in NREGS, in Scheduled Areas, may be concentrated among men. Dutta
et al. (2014) report that this type of rationing is pervasive with NREGS work in poorer
states.
3 Context: Identity, Quotas, & Development in India
The Indian government has instituted numerous forms of political quotas since Indepen-
dence. In the political arena, the constitution provides dramatic guaranteed representation
through quotas for individuals from the Scheduled Tribes (ST), Scheduled Castes (SC), Other
Backward Classes (or Other Backward Castes, OBC), and/or women in the national parlia-
ment, state legislatures, and from 1993 in the country’s three-tier system of local government
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councils, called Panchayat Raj.4
We focus in this paper on India’s Scheduled Areas, a government institution targeting
tribal populations that has not yet been subject to systematic quantitative analysis. Sched-
uled Areas cover over 100 million citizens across nine Indian states – Andhra Pradesh, Chhat-
tisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Odisha,
and Rajasthan.
The demarcation of Scheduled Areas has changed little since the initial formulation dur-
ing the pre-Independence period. British authorities first provided a list of ‘Aboriginal
Tribes’ and ‘Semi-Hinduised Aboriginal Tribes’ in the Census of 1872 (Corbridge, 2002, 64)
and implemented special institutions targeting these tribes udner the Scheduled Districts
Act of 1874. Following Independence in 1947, the new Indian state identified Scheduled
Areas in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, with minor diﬀerences from the British
Scheduled Districts Act. The government justified Scheduled Areas specifically as a means
to improve representation and welfare for Scheduled Tribes (ST) through special programs
and institutions such as the state-level Tribes Advisory Council.5
The Constitution assigns responsibility for adding, subtracting or modifying Scheduled
Areas to the President in consultation with the relevant state’s Governor. In 1962, the
Dhebar Commission proposed that an area should be eligible to become a Scheduled Area
according to four, relatively vague, criteria: i) Preponderance of tribals in the population;
ii) Compact and reasonable size; iii) Under-developed nature of the area; and iv) Marked
disparity in economic standards of the people. In practice there has been no exact formula
4While religion is an additional important identity category, since Independence the Mus-
lim minority group has been excluded from political quotas.
5We focus on the Fifth Schedule that governs the majority of Scheduled Areas in India.
An additional Sixth Schedule of the Constitution details the administration of tribal areas
in four northeastern states. For more information, see Appendix A.3.
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for updating or adjusting the previous notification or de-notification of Scheduled Areas in
India, and these Areas have remained remarkably stable since their initial formulation (see
Appendix A3).
3.1 Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas
Despite government commitments to promote ST interests in Scheduled Areas, villages on
opposing sides of the Scheduled Areas border show few diﬀerences on observables or over-time
trends prior to the implementation of the local-level political quotas that we study in this
paper (see Sections 5.2 and 7.1). Indeed, additional legislation instituting political quotas
were designed in large measure to give Scheduled Areas teeth. The Panchayats Extension to
Scheduled Areas Act of 1996 (PESA) mandated that all chairperson positions at the three
levels of local government, and at least 50% of all seats on these councils, be reserved for
ST individuals. Hence, when local elections were next held – as early as 2000 for Rajasthan
and as late as 2010 for Jharkhand – these reforms gave a tremendous positive shock to the
local-level political representation of Scheduled Tribes in India. Unlike other quotas in India
that rotate by constituency and over time, the quotas in Scheduled Areas introduced with
PESA remain fixed.
3.2 Quotas and Political Conflict: A Case Study of Jharkhand
By way of more detail, we provide a case analysis of the state of Jharkhand that has arguably
the most politically charged and turbulent path to local elections with quotas in Scheduled
Areas. Even in this politically fraught case, the actual boundaries of the Scheduled Areas
have remained relatively unchanged. While Jharkhand passed an amendment in 2001 to
allow for PESA-compliant panchayat elections, a legal challenge postponed elections. Only
after a decision by the Indian Supreme Court in 2010, upholding the constitutional status
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of identity-based quotas in India, were local elections held in Jharkhand in 2010.6
Although the state of Jharkhand was created in part to better represent tribal populations
in the state of Bihar, the actual Scheduled Areas within this region did not change. The
Scheduled Areas assigned as part of the Indian Constitution’s Fifth Schedule remained almost
entirely consistent through the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation of 1969 and re-notification
again in 1977 and 2007. The only changes were the addition to the Scheduled Areas of a single
block – Bhandaria of Garhwa district – in 1977; and the Scheduling of two village-clusters,
both within Satbarwa block, in 2007.7
3.3 Comparisons Across Indian Identity Categories
ST are not the only historically disadvantaged minority category in India, nor the only cate-
gory targeted via special legislation. Others include the Scheduled Castes, Other Backward
Classes (OBC), and women. While OBC also receive mandated representation in local gov-
ernment outside of Scheduled Areas in India, on average, and in taking India as a whole, SC
and ST communities in existing literature are considered the most stigmatized, economically
vulnerable and politically excluded communities.
The Indian government has acknowledged the vulnerable position of SC and ST com-
munities and accordingly regularly groups SC and ST together for the purposes of special
legislation.8 Outside of Scheduled Areas that privilege ST, since 1992 all local government
6Union of India And Others v. Rakesh Kumar And Others. Supreme Court of India,
January 12, 2010.
7Appendix A.6 provides further discussion on what constitutes a Scheduled Tribe and
the Scheduled Areas in Jharkhand.
8SC and ST categories first gained some preferential representation in the Government
of India Act of 1935, oﬃcially sanctioned in the Constitution via Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order, 1950 and The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. National Com-
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councils across the country restrict local council leadership positions for SC and ST, using
identical quotas in proportion to their local population that rotate every election cycle (see
Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004); Dunning and Nilekani (2013)).
Both popular and academic writing often describe SC and ST in tandem as examples
of minority groups that are the poorest and most vulnerable throughout the country. The
Indian government even studies the development of individuals from both groups together
via the elite, national government appointed, Planning Commission.9 For these reasons, we
consider outcomes for SC a useful comparison to ST outcomes – as both groups are similarly
vulnerable, yet enjoy very diﬀerent political opportunities in Scheduled Areas. Appendix A
provides more details about political quotas in India and SC and ST identity categories.
3.4 Local Government and Development
Local government panchayat institutions in India are responsible for two key aspects of de-
velopment: welfare schemes and infrastructure, each of which provide local public goods (see
Besley, Pande and Rao (2007)). Existing literature identifies roads, sanitation, electricity,
water, telephones, school and health facilities, irrigation, and communication as important
development sectors for measuring performance of panchayat institutions (Cassan and Van-
dewalle, 2017; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2015). Our empirical goal is to measure how political
reservations aﬀect the implementation of government programs.
missions for SC and ST were instituted via Articles 338 and 338A respectively. Legislation
was passed to protect individuals from both identity categories from violence in 1989 by
means of The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe - Prevention of Atrocities Act.
9See for instance http://planningcommission.gov.in/aboutus/taskforce/inter/
inter_sts.pdf.
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3.4.1 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)
As our key outcome, we chose NREGS, India’s largest development program and the largest
employment program in the world. NREGS and rights-based policies in India build on
prior legislation on decentralization and devolution of power to local government agencies.
(Kapur and Nangia, 2015) classify this welfare scheme as part of the lowest tier of social
protection in India that covers the vast majority of workers in the country (up to 94 percent)
(p. 76-77). Together with other programs like Public Distribution System and the National
Social Assistant Program, NREGS is a risk-coping, instead of risk-mitigating, program that
provides protection to those already at risk.
The scheme oﬃcially guarantees 100 days of minimum-wage employment to every rural
household in the country, with no eligibility requirements. Though increases in welfare
spending in general might come at the expense of other spending priorities, NREGS funding
comes primarily from federal and state budgets. Accordingly, local politicians who do not
take full advantage of the NREGS program are eﬀectively “leaving money on the table.”10
Jenkins and Manor (2017) document how NREGS has helped improve the lives of the poorest
in India.
Recent research shows that village-level politics are likely to play an outsized role in the
distribution of NREGS benefits (Marcesse, 2017).11 Local-level council chairpersons – whose
seats are reserved for ST under the Scheduled Areas quota – have both the capacity and
discretion to significantly alter the quality of NREGS implementation and the distribution
of NREGS benefits (Besley, Pande and Rao, 2007; Dasgupta and Kapur, 2017; Dunning and
Nilekani, 2013; Dutta et al., 2014; Sukhtankar, 2017; Marcesse, 2018).
Local-level authorities are responsible for selecting projects through collective deliber-
10We discuss concerns related to leakage in Appendix F.
11See Appendix A.2 for details on the specific responsibilities of local government under
NREGS and how local governments, nevertheless, rely on a network of local agents.
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ation in village assemblies, selecting program beneficiaries, implementing at least 50% of
all works (in terms of total cost), maintaining and transmitting records to higher author-
ities to process payments, and responding to citizens appeals for work (Sukhtankar, 2017;
Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Marcesse, 2018; Besley, Pande and Rao, 2007; Munshi and
Rosenzweig, 2015). In turn, NREGS has bolstered the legitimacy and eﬃcacy of local gov-
ernments (Sukhtankar, 2017; Jenkins and Manor, 2017). While NREGS implementation
remains uneven (see Figure 1), the scheme’s implementation carries political rewards - with
research showing good NREGS performance is an ‘election winning device’ in local politics
(Maiorano, 2014, p. 95).
The eﬀects of Scheduled Areas on NREGS outcomes that we identify could be a result of
these supply-side factors, but also changes in demand for services that diﬀer by identity cate-
gory. For example, ST might feel more comfortable in requesting work when an ST politician
is elected. Research has shown that demand and supply for NREGS work are a product of a
large ecosystem that includes informal institutions, bureaucrats, and collective deliberation
(Dutta et al., 2014; Khosla, 2011; Marcesse, 2018). Thus, we interpret changes in NREGS
outcomes as being driven by both demand and supply mechanisms, both of which would
follow changes in representation and which are thus consistent with our conceptualization in
Section 2.
Still, prior research indicates that that the binding constraints on NREGS implementation
are not demand-side but are driven almost entirely by supply-side factors (Khosla, 2011).
Dutta et al. (2014) write that “unmet demand for work is the single most important policy-
relevant factor in accounting for this gap between actual performance and the scheme’s
potential” (p. xxv). Jenkins and Manor (2017) write that while NREGS promises jobs on
demand, “many, if not most, poor rural people have little or no experience of making direct
demands on authority figures (p. 69).” Similarly, Marcesse (2018) argues that demand itself
is aﬀected by incentives of supply agents.
Further, due to the design of NREGS, it is unlikely that electoral quotas will lead individ-
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uals, including the status-quo privileged groups (as might otherwise be predicted by results
from Akerlof and Kranton (2010); Moﬃtt (1983)), to reduce their demand for work. This is
because NREGS targets poor households and individuals, in rural areas, with work – such
as digging ditches and building wells – that is “physically taxing, of uncertain duration, and
provides no employment benefits” (Dutta et al., 2014, 14). NREGS was designed for those
most in need of work, and as a last resort. Put diﬀerently, “By insisting that participants do
physically demanding manual work at a low wage rate, workfare schemes such as MGNREGS
aim to be self-targeted...nonpoor will not want to do such work, and poor people will readily
turn away from the scheme when better opportunities arise” (Dutta et al., 2014, 5,40). a
3.4.2 Beyond NREGS: Rural Roads and Other Public Goods
In addition to welfare schemes, we take two approaches to evaluate broader impacts on public
goods. First, we examine impacts of Scheduled Areas on PMGSY, the Prime Minister’s
Village Road Program. This program was established in 2000 to connect rural villages to
the all-weather road network by focusing on constructing and upgrading feeder roads that
either did not exist or were unpaved (Asher and Novosad, 2019a). As of 2001 only about
half of the 600,000 villages in India were connected to such roads. Importantly, “100 percent
funding for construction [under this program was provided] by the Central Government”
(ILO, 2015).
As with NREGS, local politicians are critical to PMGSY’s implementation, whereby a
standardized planning process is in place that incorporates representatives from district,
block, and village councils. In fact, the key role of local governments in helping carry out
construction and maintenance of roads at the local level has been inspired by their success
doing the same under NREGS (ILO, 2015).
Finally, we take a more systematic approach to studying eﬀects on public goods outcomes
by using data from the 2011 Indian Census – roughly ten years following the implementation
of PESA.
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4 Data Construction
To systematically assess how the Scheduled Areas political quota aﬀects development out-
comes, we construct a village level dataset for the nine states that have Scheduled Areas. We
begin by using the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset for India
(SHRUG) (Asher and Novosad, 2019b). This dataset allows us to track the same villages
over three diﬀerent Census waves: 1991, 2001, and 2011. SHRUG includes limited Census
data from these waves and data on the PMGSY roads program.
While SHRUG provides information at the village level, NREGS outcomes are measured
at the village-cluster (gram panchayat) level. We use a new dataset as a matching directory
for village and village-cluster data, and then apply fuzzy matching methods to combine
SHRUG and NREGS into a single dataset. We next add information on reservations: both
on whether a village falls within or outside of the Scheduled Areas, and whether a village
falls within an Assembly Constituency that is reserved for ST, for SC, or not reserved. Our
final step is to merge the combined dataset with spatial data, as well as with a more complete
set of Census variables than was available from SHRUG, on villages from the 2001 and 2011
Indian Censuses. These additional Census data were procured from InfoMap India.
Outcome Variables We use data on three central outcomes of interest from NREGS in
2012-2013: Jobcards are the total number of identification documents issued to prospective
workers before they can request to be hired under the program; Worked are the number
of households that received work under the program in the year; and Workdays measures
the total number of days worked by individuals under the program. These measures were
collected at the lowest level for which they are recorded, the village cluster, from the oﬃcial
NREGS portal. Critically, NREGS data provides all three outcomes for ST, for SC, for those
who are neither SC nor ST, and for men and women, separately. Figure 1 shows that there
is considerable variation in program implementation across India.
We supplement our main analysis by considering eﬀects of the quota on employment
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Figure 1: Variation in 2013 NREGS Workdays Across India
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(sourced from the 2011 Census), road construction under the PMGSY program (from SHRUG),
and on public goods provision (2011 Census, but only available for a subset of villages, called
market villages).
Scheduled Areas Our key independent variable is an indicator for whether a village
is or is not part of the Scheduled Areas. We obtained information on Scheduled Areas
status from the Government of India’s Ministry of Tribal Aﬀairs. See Appendix B.2 for
data sources. States release oﬃcial documents either listing specific villages as Scheduled
or, where all villages within a block or district are Scheduled, the names of those blocks and
districts. While two states list individual village names (Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan),
the remaining states list block and district names.
To remain consistent in our coding strategy across states, and to avoid human error that
was more likely to occur had we manually coded each village as Scheduled or not in the two
states that released information at this level, we elected to code an entire block as Scheduled
if any village was designated as Scheduled within the block. Empirically, this approach is
conservative because, while it accurately codes Scheduled Areas when all villages in a district
and block are inside the treatment area, it codes some untreated villages within a block as
treated – that is, the resulting bias will be in the direction of zero. Our coding is illustrated
spatially in Figure 2.12
Control Variables Our control variables, as well as the variables we use to evaluate sorting
and over-time changes, are sourced from the Census (for 1991, from SHRUG, and for 2001,
from the 2001 Census shape files).
12See Figure A4 for validation that our SA identification is done accurately and is more
granular than government maps.
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Figure 2: Scheduled Areas in India - Unit is the block. Outlined regions refer to district
boundaries.
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4.1 Summary Statistics
We combine 1991, 2001, and 2011 census data with NREGS data, Scheduled Areas coding,
and data on the PMGSY roads program. The dataset successfully matches approximately
217,000 of the 274,026 villages (79%) in the sample. 19 percent of the villages in our data are
coded as belonging to a Scheduled Area. ST comprise about 28 percent of the population,
while SC are only 13 percent of the population. Non-minorities form the remaining 59
percent. Appendix C.1 presents summary statistics.
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Geographic Regression Discontinuity
Consider two proximate villages lying on opposite sides of the Scheduled/non-Scheduled
boundary. If they are suﬃciently similar on observable characteristics, we can say that the
only diﬀerence between the two villages is that one village lies in a Scheduled Area, while
the other is in a non-Scheduled Area. We approximate this thought experiment with a
geographic regression discontinuity design that restricts attention to villages geographically
proximate to a boundary dividing Scheduled Areas and other areas within a state.13 We use
the following specification:
yvgs = γScheduled Areavgs + as + f(Xvgs, Yvgs) + Z
′
vgsφ+ #vgs (1)
∀ v s.t. Xvgs, Yvgs ∈ (−h, h)
where yvgs refers to outcomes for village v in gram panchayat g and state s. The oﬃcial
NREGS portal only releases data at the gram panchayat level. In NREGS regressions, all
villages in the same gram panchayat are assigned the same outcome value, whereas for Census
13Appendix D.1 also presents simple OLS comparisons for main results.
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2011 and PMGSY, y varies at the village level. Although treatment is assigned at the village
level, we cluster standard errors at the gram panchayat level throughout the paper. This
has the benefit of correcting for outcome inter-dependence within the gram panchayat in the
NREGS analysis.
Scheduled Areavgs is the treatment variable that equals 1 if a village is coded as being in
a Scheduled Area, and 0 otherwise. Outcomes that are left-skewed are logged such that γ can
be interpreted in percentage terms. State fixed eﬀects as account for any state level shocks,
including the diﬀerent timing of PESA implementation. f(Xvgs, Yvgs) is a flexible smooth
function in two dimensions, latitudes (X) and longitudes (Y ).14 Adding these geographic
controls helps the regression absorb spatial trends that might be superfluously driving results.
For each village, we calculate distance in kilometers h to a Scheduled Areas border within
the same state so that we may compare villages that provide the closest approximation to
random assignment. Based on bandwidth selection algorithms (see Appendix Table A18)
we take a conservative bandwidth of 10 kilometers as our standard bandwidth (h). 10km
is about one-fifth the size of the median distance (54.4km), and about one-ninth the mean
distance (91.3km), from the border in the data (see Figure A8). Last, we include a vector of
all village-level Census 2001 indices as well as 1991 and 2001 SC and ST population shares,
Z
′
vgs.
Throughout the analysis, we conduct various robustness tests, including varying band-
widths and functional forms, considering alternate transformations of outcomes, and ac-
counting for spatial spillovers.
14Following Dell (2010), our main specifications use the functional form: x+ y+x2+ y2+
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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5.2 Analysis of Balance with Census Data
With pre-treatment census data at the village level from 2001 and population data from 1991,
we analyze balance by evaluating if Scheduled Area predicts census variables. To manage
the vast number of 2001 census variables, we collapse the 140 variables into 14 substantively
meaningful indices by taking the simple mean of their standardized values. We describe this
process in Appendix G.
Overall, we find that the geographic RD model yields good balance between Scheduled
and non-Scheduled Areas. While we are able to tell the two groups apart in some cases
statistically because of the large sample size, the substantive diﬀerences across Scheduled and
non-Scheduled Areas are small: they remain below 0.1 standard deviations for all but three
indices (see Appendix Table A10). Only diﬀerences for water, urbanization, and banking
indices exceed 0.10 standard deviations, but even in these cases, the diﬀerences stay below
0.22. More substantively, the diﬀerences we do observe tend toward zero as the bandwidth
of analysis shrinks (see Appendix Figure A6). In addition, for all variables we can trace
across the 1991 and 2001 census waves, there is little reason to believe that the baseline
diﬀerences are trending diﬀerently over time in Scheduled versus non-Scheduled Areas (see
Appendix Figure A7), indicating that controlling for level diﬀerences between Scheduled
and non-Scheduled Areas may be suﬃcient. Accordingly, in our analysis we control for all
fourteen 2001 indices, both imbalanced and balanced.
6 The Impact of Scheduled Areas
6.1 Eﬀects on NREGS
Table 2 presents the main results on NREGS outcomes. The first column shows treatments
eﬀects at the extensive margin, while the remaining three columns decompose this eﬀect
across ST, SC and Non-SC/ST categories.
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Our first finding is that NREGS outcomes improve substantially for STs. As shown in
column 2, 20.7% (p < 0.01) more job cards are issued to STs in Scheduled Areas. This result
carries forward to the number of households that receive work during the year through
NREGS – the coeﬃcient reflects a 20.3% (p < 0.01) increase. Overall, the number of
workdays STs receive increases by 24.1% (p < 0.01), a jump of about 1,040 more days of
work. Second, there is strong evidence that non-SC/STs are the main losers, as shown in
column 4. Not only does this group receive 9.8% (p < 0.01) fewer job cards in Scheduled
Areas, they also suﬀer a reduction in the number of households employed (8.6%, p < 0.05)
as well as the total number of workdays (12.5%, p < 0.01). Third, we find no evidence
that SCs are worse oﬀ under Scheduled Areas: the point estimates on all variables are
substantively small and are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Finally, putting these
results together in column 1, there is no evidence that Scheduled Areas aﬀect the extensive
margin of program implementation – the total amount of work remains the same across
Scheduled and non-Scheduled Areas, as the point estimates on outcomes are small, ranging
from 1% on workdays to 0% on jobcards.15
6.2 Intersecting Identities: Decomposing Gender Eﬀects
Do marginalized women comparatively benefit from Scheduled Areas? While “one aim of
[NREGS] was to encourage women from poor households to under take work” (Jenkins and
Manor, 2017, p. 174), checking this for NREGS is diﬃcult as the data do not decompose
15In Appendix D we show that our results are robust to a number of tests, including various
functional forms, bandwidths, transformations of outcomes, and controls for the number of
matched villages. Appendix F shows there is no evidence for two alternative explanations:
that discrepancies in reporting, and that diﬀerences in reliance on centralized government
between Scheduled and non-Scheduled Areas account for identified eﬀects.
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Table 2: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Log Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 0.000 0.207*** -0.038 -0.098***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Log Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 0.009 0.203*** -0.017 -0.086***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Log Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.010 0.241*** 0.009 -0.125***
(0.035) (0.046) (0.053) (0.045)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by GP.
outcomes by both identity and gender.16
We make some progress by analyzing the eﬀects of Scheduled Areas on employment
prospects by gender and types of workers in the 2011 Census. These data provide em-
ployment statistics across two categories defined by the Census: “main workers,” who were
employed more than 183 days, or about 6 months, in the 12 months preceding the Census,
and “marginal workers,” who were employed for less than 183 days.
If a large portion of individuals are solely employed through NREGS, we should expect
primary gains among marginal workers due to the 100 NREGS workday maximum per
household. However, individuals might also supplement their NREGS work which would
make it reasonable to expect eﬀects among main workers. Indeed, prior work shows that
16Nevertheless, Appendix Table A20 presents results by gender for workdays under NREGS
(the only outcome for which gender decomposed data are available) and shows that there
are no key diﬀerences at least at the extensive margin across gender.
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NREGS has positive eﬀects on private sector employment by raising the rural reservation
wage (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2017). In addition, 70 percent of NREGS
work occurs during the lean season, additively bringing new labor into the market (Jenkins
and Manor, 2017, p. 170).
We observe three results in Table 3. First, consistent with the extensive margin results
on NREGS, there is no eﬀect on average employment. Second, women experience about 2.5
percent gains in employment, while men are worse oﬀ by 1.9 percent. Third, relative to the
other gender, the primarily beneficiaries of Scheduled Areas are ‘marginal’ women workers,
whose employment increases by 3%, while the primary losers are ‘main’ men workers.17
Table 3: Eﬀects on Employment (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Women Men
Panel A: Log # Overall Workers
Scheduled Areas -0.007 0.025* -0.019**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 552.0 231.9 319.9
# GPs 13277 13277 13277
# Villages 32522 32522 32522
H0: γ(2) - γ(3) = 0 p < 0.000
Panel B: Log # Main Workers (> 183 days)
Scheduled Areas -0.018 0.002 -0.021
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 377.6 128.0 249.5
# GPs 13277 13277 13277
# Villages 32522 32522 32522
H0: γ(2) - γ(3) = 0 p = 0.104
Panel C: Log # Marginal Workers (< 183 days)
Scheduled Areas 0.001 0.030 -0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 173.9 103.9 70.0
# GPs 13277 13277 13277
# Villages 32522 32522 32522
H0: γ(2) - γ(3) = 0 p < 0.001
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by GP. Additional controls include
outcome baseline measures from the 2001 Census.
17Appendix E.4 shows several robustness exercises.
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How do we interpret these results? Control means show that women are more likely to
be employed as marginal workers than are men, suggesting that they work fewer days of the
year on average. The treatments eﬀects indicate that it may be these types of underemployed
workers who benefit the most in Scheduled Areas, suggesting the possibility that ST women
benefit more from the increase in average ST workdays.
6.3 Eﬀects on the Rural Roads Program (PMGSY)
Are there implications of instituting electoral quotas beyond the eﬀects we observe on
NREGS and employment in general? Finding evidence of broader impacts will improve
our confidence that the institution of Scheduled Areas improved the lives of poor commu-
nities. It would also help allay the concern that changes in NREGS come at the cost of
changes in other programs.18
We first consider impacts on the PMGSY roads program. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that
villages in Scheduled Areas are about three percentage points more likely to have completed
roads through the program using our geo RD specification.
An important feature of the PMGSY data is the time variation in road construction,
which, along with state-by-state variation in the implementation of PESA elections, aﬀords
us the opportunity to study the impacts of Scheduled Areas on roads before and after the
introduction of electoral quotas. Using village, year, and year since PESA elections fixed
eﬀects, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy allows us to consider within-village changes in
PMGSY implementation over time. We find that post-PESA elections, Scheduled Areas
villages in our geo RD sample (column 2) are 1 percentage point more likely to have a
PMGSY road, an eﬀect of about 20%. This percentage increases to nearly 5% (an increase of
18For example, quota politicians may prefer NREGS relative to other priorities because
NREGS allows them to perpetuate patronage through handout of state resources (Marcesse,
2017).
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Table 4: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on Rural Roads (PMGSY)
Outcome: Road=1
Model: Geo RD Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ
Sample: 10km 10km Full
(1) (2) (3)
Scheduled Areas 0.029***
(0.004)
Sch Areas × Post PESA Election 0.010*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.002)
Non-Scheduled Mean 0.127 0.051 0.056
# GPs 13338 13338 74120
# Villages 32641 32641 217144
# Observations 32641 456974 3040016
Geo RD Controls Yes - -
Village FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
Year of PESA FE No Yes Yes
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by GP.
over 80%) using the full dataset of villages. Figure 3 additionally shows that road sanctioning
increased in Scheduled Areas soon after the introduction of elections but not before. Eﬀects
on the completion of roads followed after a few years.
6.4 Impacts on Public Goods
Guided by the literature on the responsibilities of local governments in India detailed in
Section 3.4, we also evaluate the eﬀect of Scheduled Areas more broadly on public goods
using data from the 2011 Census. We construct six mean indices that take the average of
binary indicators on the presence of particular public goods in a village, such as whether
there is a gravel road. These indices measure the average provision of roads, water, irrigation,
electricity, communication, and education. Similarly, an overall public goods index averages
all individual public goods indicator variables.
Overall, the results presented in Figure 4 show that public goods provision in Scheduled
Areas improved by 2011, particularly in terms of road, water, communication, and education
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Figure 3: The Eﬀect of the Introduction of PESA Election on PMGSY Roads
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Notes : This figure plots binned means of PMGSY roads by Scheduled Area status on a
dataset of all villages that is residualized for village fixed eﬀects.
access. The results on roads are consistent with our earlier results: we see positive treatment
eﬀects on the most local kinds of roads, gravel roads, projects that are targeted specifically by
the NREGS program. We also see improved access to all-weather roads which is consistent
with the PMGSY results.19
6.5 Discussion: Bringing the Results Together
In light of these results, we return to the competing hypotheses suggested by the literature
that we summarized in Table 1. First, we consider the NREGS results which allow us to
study distribution of resources across identity categories. We do not find any evidence for
the Solidarity Hypothesis: increased descriptive representation for one minority group,
19Appendix E.5 presents several robustness exercises.
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Figure 4: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on Public Goods (Census 2011).
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STs, does not appear to improve outcomes for a non-targeted minority group, SCs. We
find support for the Crowding Out Hypothesis to the extent that there is negative
substitution away from the residual non-SC/ST group, which is consistent with the aims
of programs designed to redistribute economic and political power. Importantly, there is no
evidence for outcomes worsening for SCs or at the extensive margin.
The NREGS results are also consistent with the weak version of the Performance
Hypothesis. At the extensive margin, we find that NREGS implementation is no worse
in Scheduled as compared with non-Scheduled Areas. Evidence on overall employment,
PMGSY, and public goods outcomes from the 2011 Census show improvements across the
board, results consistent with the strong version of the performance hypothesis.
How might we square these contrasting results? One interpretation consistent with re-
sults and the literature (for example, Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004)) is that marginalized
politicians empowered under Scheduled Areas invest more in policies prioritized by their com-
munities. We observe employment gains for the most vulnerable: women marginal workers.
Similarly, Scheduled Areas have positive eﬀects on the PMGSY program that aimed to grant
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market access to poor rural communities, and on public goods outcomes that are most im-
portant for marginalized groups. In sum, the broader eﬀects we identify may reflect greater
investment in the welfare of marginalized communities. In that sense, the broader results
are consistent with NREGS findings that Scheduled Areas improve the welfare of ST.
Importantly, the results run contrary to the expectations of aﬃrmative action skeptics:
while we do not find that politicians from underrepresented groups outperform other politi-
cians on NREGS, they certainly do not perform worse, and they perform better on a program
(PMGSY) where explicit targeting of benefits to marginalized communities is less possible.
In addition, gains for the targeted group under NREGS do not come at the expense of
similarly marginalized populations.
7 Investigating the Electoral Mechanism
To what extent does an electoral mechanism explain how the Scheduled Areas have improved
development outcomes for ST? We present four pieces of evidence in support of an electoral
mechanism.
7.1 Scheduled Areas Prior to PESA
Prior to the implementation of electoral quotas, Scheduled Areas and non-Scheduled Areas
looked very similar as our geographic RD analysis of the 2001 Census shows in Section
5.2. This analysis mirrors a critical 1995 report by the Indian Parliament-appointed Bhuria
Commission, which found little to no devolution of governance and authority to tribal bodies
in Scheduled Areas, and argued that tribal populations should enjoy greater self-governance
and less governmental administrative interference.
... since planned development has been an article of faith with us, it has to be
ensured that implementation of the policies and programmes drawn up in tribal
interest are implemented in tribal interest. Since, by and large, the politico-
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bureaucratic apparatus has failed in its endeavour, powers should be devolved on
the people so that they can formulate programmes which suit them and imple-
ment them for their own benefits.
Policies following from these findings were made into law via PESA, passed in 1996 and
going into eﬀect with state panchayat elections from 2000. In this way, PESA gave the
Scheduled Areas teeth that they had theretofore lacked.
7.2 Targeted Minority Electoral Influence
Table 5: Treatment Eﬀects by ST Plurality versus Minority (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 0.012 0.037 -0.052 -0.068*
(0.017) (0.030) (0.044) (0.035)
ST Minority 0.040* 0.140*** -0.139*** -0.100***
(0.021) (0.038) (0.042) (0.034)
Scheduled × ST Minority -0.028 0.383*** 0.034 -0.068*
(0.022) (0.044) (0.049) (0.039)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
Panel B: Worked HH
Scheduled Areas 0.015 0.065* 0.004 -0.058
(0.027) (0.036) (0.043) (0.039)
ST Minority -0.009 0.055 -0.141*** -0.177***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042)
Scheduled × ST Minority -0.013 0.313*** -0.045 -0.062
(0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas 0.023 0.059 0.055 -0.071
(0.043) (0.053) (0.072) (0.060)
ST Minority -0.010 0.178** -0.255*** -0.265***
(0.061) (0.071) (0.073) (0.068)
Scheduled × ST Minority -0.074 0.409*** -0.102 -0.120*
(0.059) (0.078) (0.081) (0.072)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by GP.
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Prior work suggests that quota eﬀects are largest where the targeted minority group
constitutes a large share of the population (Chin and Prakash, 2011; Jensenius, 2015; Pande,
2003; Das, Mukhopadhyay and Saroy, 2017). For instance, Jensenius (2015) reports that
some SC politicians want to divert funds to SC constituents but do not do so “because
they are scared of being branded as ‘too SC”’ (p.203) by the majority of voters who are
non-SC and on whose votes they depend. Alternatively, while it is true that STs retain
the most power when they have both a high share of population and electoral reservations,
theoretically, the introduction of quotas should have the greatest marginal impact in places
where STs did not possess as much electoral strength initially. To test this, we create an
indicator variable for whether ST are a non-plurality:
ST Minorityv = ¬ST P luralityv = 1 · (ST popv < max(SC popv, non SC/ST popv))
Table 5 presents heterogeneous eﬀects with our standard RD specification. There are
two findings. First, for each of the three main outcomes of interest, we find that Scheduled
Areas have a larger positive eﬀect for ST in places where ST comprised an electoral minority
prior to the implementation of PESA. The result suggests that the electoral quota may
be most eﬀective at improving the lives of groups that see the greatest increase in their
electoral strength due to the quota. Second, as before, the negative spillover on the residual
non-SC/ST category is also more pronounced in these areas.
7.3 Quota Overlap
A certain proportion of State Assembly seats across India are reserved for minorities including
ST and SC based on population (Jensenius, 2012). Although the higher-level quotas are
not randomly assigned, we can use them to investigate quota overlap at diﬀerent levels
of government. On the one hand, multiple quota politicians should reinforce the eﬀect
of political quotas by improving potential coordination between politicians who share an
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identity. On the other hand, there could exist some diminishing returns to quota politician
eﬀort because of credit claiming diﬃculties and free riding problems (Gulzar and Pasquale,
2017).
While our main results are robust to controlling for the incidence of Assembly Con-
stituency level ST reservation (see Appendix Table A31), in Table 6 we interact these higher
level reservations in the latest election before 2013 with the Scheduled Areas treatment
indicator to study if overlapping Assembly Constituency reservations moderate eﬀects on
program implementation. The results show that Scheduled Areas reservations and Assem-
bly Constituency reservations for ST, separately, improve NREGS program implementation
tremendously for ST. However, when the two quotas overlap, the overall implementation of
the program is less than the separate parts, suggesting that there exist some ceiling eﬀects.20
Overall, the results are consistent with program implementation varying with political insti-
tutions.
7.4 Local Elections in Scheduled Areas
Consistent with the historical discussion above, patterns in the data also show that the
introduction of PESA is an important driver in diﬀerences between Scheduled Areas and
non-Scheduled Areas. We already presented corroborating evidence of the importance of
PESA’s introduction for the PMGSY program in Figure 3. In contrast, because we only
observe NREGS outcomes at a single point in time, we lack any within-state variation in
PESA introduction when considering these outcomes. With this limitation in mind, in
Appendix Table A28 we interact the Scheduled Areas indicator with the number of elections
between 2000 and 2012 that have taken place in a state under PESA: either one, two,
or three. We find that the main results hold up but the magnitude decreases over time.
20Interestingly, we find that when the Assembly Constituency reservation is for SC, there
are no negative quota overlap eﬀects for ST (see Appendix Table A32).
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Table 6: Additional Quota in Assembly Constituency (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total ST SC Non-SC/ST
Panel A: Job Cards
Scheduled Areas -0.012 0.405*** -0.089* -0.128***
(0.019) (0.041) (0.046) (0.031)
AC Reserved, ST 0.200*** 0.876*** -0.109** -0.140***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.044) (0.031)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, ST -0.015 -0.482*** 0.103* 0.074
(0.027) (0.051) (0.062) (0.046)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 0.019 0.388*** -0.100** -0.111***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.048) (0.042)
AC Reserved, ST 0.454*** 0.914*** 0.012 0.053
(0.030) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, ST -0.096** -0.465*** 0.137** 0.033
(0.044) (0.060) (0.063) (0.057)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.054 0.419*** -0.165** -0.196***
(0.051) (0.076) (0.078) (0.060)
AC Reserved, ST 0.595*** 1.289*** -0.011 0.092
(0.047) (0.061) (0.073) (0.061)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, ST -0.029 -0.520*** 0.292*** 0.101
(0.068) (0.093) (0.105) (0.085)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# Blocks 626 626 626 626
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by GP.
This may be consistent with quotas having the greatest marginal impact for the targeted
minority in the first election, where quotas constitute a shock to political representation. In
subsequent elections, as members of the targeted minority “catch up” to other groups, and
as quota politicians learn the intricacies of the position, quota politicians may distribute
more benefits to other groups and deliver overall gains.
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8 Conclusion
Policymakers often treat economic and political eﬀorts in isolation. We show that political
aﬃrmative action and development programs may serve as complementary levers to deliver
better outcomes for marginalized communities, at no cost to other minorities, nor to society
overall.
Our empirical setting is political aﬃrmative action in India, where Scheduled Areas,
as well as similar reservations more generally, are hotly debated and politically divisive.
Protests and riots have broken out for a myriad of related aﬃrmative action issues – out
of fear of reductions in protections for SC and ST throughout India, in anticipation of
the implementation of elections in Scheduled Areas, by groups agitating for inclusion in
identity categories targeted by quotas, and in an eﬀort to extend Scheduled Areas into new
jurisdictions (AlJazeera, 2018; Singh, 2018; ETBureau, 2018; Iyengar, 2015). Despite their
importance, scale, and salience, Scheduled Areas remain understudied in political science and
related disciplines. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic evaluation of
this institution.
We propose a novel theoretical framework comprising solidarity, crowding-out, and perfor-
mance hypotheses to understand the systematic eﬀects of political aﬃrmative action across
groups. To test these, we build a new large-scale dataset combining administrative data on
the largest employment program in the world, a rural roads program, as well as public goods
from the Indian Census. We find that quotas deliver no worse outcomes overall and that
gains for targeted minorities come at the cost of the relatively privileged, rather than other
historically disadvantaged groups. More broadly, improvements in other pro-poor policies,
including a rural roads program and general public goods, further attest to the complemen-
tary impacts of political aﬃrmative action and pro-poor economic development.
Eﬀects appear to operate through an electoral mechanism. They appear strongly (1)
after the introduction of local elections with reservations for minorities, (2) where the quota
is theoretically most likely to have the largest marginal impact – that is – in places where
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the targeted minority group was previously least powerful), and (3) where there is no overlap
with other quotas targeting the same minority.
What are the implications of our results on debates surrounding aﬃrmative action? Skep-
tics routinely argue that open competition in the political sphere brings the best politicians to
the fore. However, our results show that quota politicians perform no worse than status-quo
politicians. This suggests that status-quo institutions may prevent equally qualified individ-
uals from marginalized communities from running for oﬃce and more eﬀectively representing
their communities.
What are the long-term consequences of electoral aﬃrmative action? Our study measures
impacts up to 12 years after implementation of the institution and finds large positive eﬀects
for the targeted minority. One concern for the longer term is that fixed political aﬃrmative
action may develop its own unequal political structures by simply replacing which identity
group is on top. Eﬀorts that helpfully redistribute political power initially could create long-
run political monopolies. We consider this to be an important open question to be explored
in the future.
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A Background
A.1 Authors’ Summary of Extant Work
Table A1: Authors’ Summary of Past Work
Eﬀects on
Quota Quota Targeted Spillover Central #
Paper Targets Level Minorities Eﬀects Outcomes Observations
Dunning and Nilekani (2013) SC/ST Village No N/A Reported participation in welfare programs 512 gram panchayats (GPs)
Jensenius (2015) SC State No None Literacy, employment, village amenities 896 state constituences
Pande (2003) SC/ST State Yes Negative Overall spending, spending on education, welfare 519 state-year
Chin and Prakash (2011) SC/ST State Only ST Positive Poverty measures 627 state-year
Parthasarathy, Rao and Palaniswamy (2017) Women Village Yes Negative Participation in conversation, state responsiveness 50 villages
Besley, Pande and Rao (2007) SC/ST Village Yes N/A Government transfers to households 201 GPs (527 villages)
Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) Women, SC/ST Village Yes N/A Constituent policy preferences, gov spending 265 GPs
Bardhan, Mookherjee and Torrado (2010) SC/ST Village Yes Positive Household benefits: water, employment, etc 57 GPs (89 villages)
Palaniswamy and Krishnan (2012) SC Village Yes Positive Spending 80 GPs (225 villages)
Bhavnani (2009) Women State Yes N/A Electoral outcomes 118 election wards
Beaman et al. (2010) Women Village Yes None Investment in drinking water 197 villages
Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) SC Village Yes N/A Household beneficiary status 522 villages
Chauchard (2014) SC Village Yes N/A Social attitudes, norms, stereotypes 64 GPs
Dunning (2010) SC/ST Village Yes N/A Political attitudes and preferences 200 GPs
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A.2 Role of Local Institutions in NREGS Implementation
The Panchayati Raj Institutions have a significant role to play in the implementation of a
number of local development activities and program as shown in Figure A1. The degree
and nature of their eﬀort therefore is an important contribution to this significant variation
across even local areas. See Figures A1 and A2 for details of the role of local government
institutions in NREGS delivery.
Figure A1 shows that Panchayati Raj Institutions are responsible for planning, benefi-
ciary selection, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation aspects of NREGS imple-
mentation. Similarly, Figure A1 shows that the Gram Panchayat is an important node for
NREGS implementation that, nevertheless, rests in a wider networks of important agents.
Figure A1: PRI Duties (source: (ILO, 2015))
A4
Figure A2: NREGS Implementation (source: Raabe, Sekher and Schiﬀer (2010))
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A.3 Background on Political Quotas in India
Political quotas restrict the representation or leadership of government bodies. The govern-
ment body may be a local or national administrative body, an elected local council, a state
parliament or a national-level parliament.21 While quotas most commonly target citizens
(e.g. for positions as bureaucrats) or leadership positions (in councils or parliaments), quotas
may also target particular geographic areas (e.g. with provisions for local autonomy).
Even prior to Indian Independence, the British government implemented quotas for in-
dividuals from particular ethnic identity categories. The Morley-Minto reforms in 1909 es-
tablished separate electorates for Muslims. In 1919, the Mont-Ford reforms tied this ‘quota’
inversely to the proportion of Muslims in a given province (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2010,
560-561). Beyond political quotas for the national parliament, state parliaments, local gov-
ernment, Fifth Schedule Areas, several other types of political quotas exist in India. Broadly
similar to the Fifth Schedule, the Indian Constitution’s Sixth Schedule allows for the cre-
ation of Autonomous Councils. These councils for Scheduled Tribe communities, typically
at the district or village levels, provide some legislative, administrative and judicial powers
in areas now and formerly contained within the state of Assam (Chaudhury, 2005).22
Another example of a territorial quota is the delimitation of electoral boundaries. In
both the national (Lok Sabha) and state (Vidhan Sabha) parliaments, the shape and number
21While not strictly meeting the definition of a type of government policy, political parties
may also implement quotas. See for instance Mala Htun who analyzes why quotas for
women are more likely to be utilized in parties but ethnic quotas more likely to be designed
for legislatures (Htun, 2004).
22Reforms under the Sixth Schedule, also targeting the welfare of ST, according to our
research, have been less consistent over time and space. Further we have been thus far unable
to gather systematic data on the Autonomous District Councils at the heart of the Sixth
Schedule, though we do believe this an area ripe for systematic research.
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of electoral constituencies in a given area are determined by the size of the local population.
Electoral redistricting was completed following every decennial census in 1952, 1963, 1973,
and after a nearly three-decade delay, again in 2002 (Iyer and Reddy, 2013).23 Even the
linguistic reorganization of states, based on the States Reorganisation Act of 1956, can be
considered a quota that generated state boundaries based on the relative linguistic homo-
geneity of a particular area (Tillin, 2013, Chapter 2).
For ordinary individuals, quotas influence individual’s access to state education, govern-
ment employment, and even rights to land. Reservations set aside places for individuals
from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women, in some states for individuals from
Other Backward Classes, and even some religious groups (Corbridge, 2000; Galanter, 1984).
Even land rights can be considered a type of quota. In Jharkhand for instance, customary
laws such as the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act both re-
strict land sales to individuals who are not associated with Scheduled Tribes (Sundar, 2005;
Upadhya, 2009).
A.4 Background on Tribes in India
Early accounts of ‘tribal’ populations listed these groups as savages: animistic, violent, bru-
tal, barbaric, wild. The Fifth Report of the House of Commons in 1812 described the inhab-
itants of Chotanagpur as a ‘savage race, diﬀering extremely in appearance, religion. British
oﬃcials constructed Chotanagpur’s ‘tribes’ through the lenses of 18th and 19th C. Victorian
23In 1977 delimitation was halted following complaints that delimitation according to pop-
ulation size incentivized certain population control policies. New legislation froze electoral
boundaries in 1977 until delimitation was once again completed in 2002 Iyer and Reddy
(2013, 5-6).
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anthropology of racial types socio-cultural evolution (Damodaran, 2011, 58-59).24 These
administrator’s conceptualizations, built not only on travelers’ reports and racial theory but
also their readings of sacred Hindu texts informed these constructions (Radhakrishna, 2011,
45-46).
British observers also made reference to the relative seclusion of Chotanagpur communi-
ties with references to the jungle, forest, inhospitable forest, wilderness and so-called ‘primi-
tive places.’ S.C Roy wrote that Mundas settled in “primeval forests ... unmolested in their
isolated mountain fastness ... walled oﬀ from the outside walls by chains of wooded hills”
(1970: 60-61). As an example, anthropologist Verrier Elwin just after the end of the 19th C.
proposed a system of national parks in order to preserve cultures of the Munda, Ho, Oraon
and so on (Radhakrishna, 2011, 53).25 Perceptions of Chotanagpur’s ‘tribes’ roughly shifted
from at first a wild savage to a ‘noble’ savage, and eventually to indigenous groups that
needed to be protected from Aryan (then Hindu) invaders. In this way the British colonial
government saw itself as “protectors of wild yet innocent tribals against rapacious outsiders”
(Gupta, 2011a, 97). This shift followed the growth of 19th C. humanitarianism in Europe
and the growth of missionaries in Chotanagpur.
24British oﬃcials such as Colonel Tickell and Ricketts in the 1840s-1850s, administra-
tors W.W. Hunter and E. Dalton in late 19th C. and anthropologists S.C. Roy and Elwin
Verrier around 1910, had all written of distinct Munda, Ho and Oraon communities. See
(Damodaran, 2011; Gupta, 2011a,b; Galanter, 1984; Guha, 1996; Radhakrishna, 2011) for
more on how British oﬃcials documented ‘tribal’ populations.
25Despite these accounts 19th C. reports of British oﬃcials and anthropologists make clear
that communities in Singhbhum were not isolated but regularly interacted with groups in
northern Jharkhand (Corbridge, Jewitt and Kumar, 2004).
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A.5 Scheduled Tribes
India’s ‘tribal’ identity category was first codified, with corresponding separate adminis-
trative areas specified, during the British Colonial period. Scholars have identified these
‘tribal’ groups (or adivasi) by (a) their descent from particular lineages (Sundar, 2009), (b)
pre-colonial systems of administration, and/or (c) well-defined land arrangements and rights
(Gupta, 2011a,b). Despite regular mention of these factors, scholars agree that there has
been little clear definition or criteria as to what constitutes a ‘tribe’ (Be´teille, 1974, 1986;
Dhebar, 1962; Corbridge, Jewitt and Kumar, 2004; Corbridge, 2002; Galanter, 1984).
Both prior to and following Indian Independence, leaders of the country have failed to
systematically define what constitutes a ‘tribe’ (or ‘Scheduled Tribe’). Definitions that have
been given are vague, imprecise, and unclear – suggesting that lists of ‘tribes’ or ST were often
reflected the political convenience of whomever administered the region. Despite numerous
studies by Colonial administrator-anthropologist and close attention paid to the so-called
‘tribes’ of Chotanagpur, relatively little eﬀort was given to writing rules for distinguishing
a tribe or tribal from the rest of the population.26 British authorities first provided a list of
‘Aboriginal Tribes’ and ‘Semi-Hinduised Aboriginal Tribes’ in the Census of 1872 (Corbridge,
2002, 64). Census Commissioner H.H. Risley described a tribe as follows:
A tribe as I find in India is a collection of families or groups of families bearing a
common name which as a rule does not denote any specific occupation; generally
claiming common descent from a mythical or historical ancestor and occasionally
from an animal, but in some parts of the country held together by the obligations
of blood-feud than by the tradition of kinship; usually speaking the same language
26Chotanagpur is a region of Eastern India covering parts of the states of Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Odisha and West Bengal – a region with some of the largest tribal populations
in India and a region geographically proximate to the Colonial capital of Calcutta (today
Kolkata).
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and occupying, professing, or claiming to occupy a definite tract of country. A
tribe is not necessarily endogamous. (H.H. (1903, 514), as quoted in Pati (2011,
4).
In 1911, The Imperial Gazetteer of India provided a striking similar definition: “A collection
of families bearing a common name, speaking a common dialect, occupying or professing to
occupy a common territory and is not usually endogamous though originally it might have
been so” (Nazer, 2004, 1). These definitions provide tremendous leeway for colonial oﬃcers
to assign groups however they like. When J.H. Hutton, Indian Census Commissioner in
1931, sought to provide a list of ‘tribes’ he aimed to utilize the basis of “soul-substance”
(Corbridge, Jewitt and Kumar, 2004, 30).
Despite the lack of clear criteria identifying so-called Tribals, special institutions were
put in place for their protection with the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874. This territorial
designation led to legislation with the aim of protecting tribals rights to their land, for
instance through the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act of 1908. Upon Indian Independence from
the British, the new constitution continued these policies of special administration in what
were to become renamed “Scheduled Areas.”27
In 1951 the First Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
admitted that no precise method for identifying Scheduled Tribes had been created to date
(Report 1951: 11). The report went on to note four characteristics identify a tribal: “tribal
origin, primitive way of life, remote habitation, and general backwardness in all respects”
(Report 1951: 109-111). Subsequent Commissions focused on Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes reinforced the idea that little new information, methods of categorization or
27Under the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution (1947), Scheduled Areas were cre-
ated to allow customary practices and autonomy of Scheduled Tribes in these regions. By
order of the President, a list of Scheduled Tribes and a list of Scheduled Areas was produced
in 1950.
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codification guided what constituted or defined either Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Areas.
Sociologist Andre Beteille has written, “lists of Indian tribes were in fact drawn up, with
or without benefit of clear and consistent definitions” (Be´teille, 1986, 299), and, “it cannot
be too strongly emphasized that the list reflects the demands more of administrative and
political circumstance than of academic or logical rigour” (Be´teille, 1974, 62).
Indian Government oﬃcials even admitted the lack of definitions. According to the
Dhebar Commission in 1961, “the term tribe is nowhere defined in the Constitution and in
fact there is no satisfactory definition anywhere” (1962: 1). The Lokur Committee wrote
when revising the list of Scheduled Tribes in 1965: “I have looked for indications of primitive
traits, distinctive culture, geographic isolation, shyness of contact with the community at
large and backwardness” (Galanter, 1984, 152).28
According to the Indian Constitution, Scheduled Areas are to define in those areas with
a large fraction of the population belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. But this mapping of
Scheduled Tribes to Scheduled Areas is equally unclear. Oﬃcially, according to the Fifth
Schedule of the Constitution the President has the right to Schedule or De-schedule Areas
and does so in consultation with Governors of Indian states. The Dhebar Commission of 1962
proposed a Scheduled Area be identified according to the following four, relatively vague,
criteria.29
28Galanter notes this rough definition was reused in 1976: “this language is utilized almost
verbatim by the Home Minister more than 10 years later in the debate about revision of the
list” (1984: 152, fn. 143).
29In the mid-1970s the Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes proposed a clearer rule that areas with more than fifty-percent Sched-
uled Tribe population should be Scheduled Areas (Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, N.d., 117). But as we will show below, no such 50% threshold exists in
terms of defining Scheduled Areas.
A11
1. Preponderance of tribals in the population
2. Compact and reasonable size
3. Under-developed nature of the area
4. Marked disparity in economic standards of the people
While academic research and popular accounts discussing the Scheduled Areas have fo-
cused on political quotas, Scheduled Areas and PESA have several additional features in-
tended to benefit ST. These include the establishment of state-level Tribes Advisory Councils
intended to advocate on behalf of ST, restrictions over the sale of land, in an eﬀort to prevent
alienation of land by ST, as well as, within villages, reinforcing a given village’s gram sabha
(a sub-gram panchayat body), as an important unit of local decision-making.
Appendix Figure A3 below shows while the probability that an area is demarcated as a
Scheduled Area is rising in the share of the ST population, there is no discontinuous jump in
Scheduled Areas status where Scheduled Tribes constitute more than 50% of a village’s total
population. We see a similar continuity in the probability if we conduct an RD on whether
the village has an ST plurality.
A.6 Case Study: The State of Jharkhand
A.6.1 Who is an ST?
After Independence the Government of Bihar made a clear break from historical laws giving
uniform but distinct rights to the whole of Jharkhand. By means of the Scheduled Areas
Order 1950 and the Scheduled Tribes Order 1951, the Government of Bihar eﬀectively halved
the amount of territory defined as Scheduled Areas and substantially shrunk the number of
groups classified as ST. While the British Census of Chotanagpur in 1872 listed 31 aborig-
inal and 31 semi-aboriginal groups, the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1951 listed 30 such ST
communities. According to Corbridge, according to the Census of 1951, “just 31.15% of
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Figure A3: Assignment of Scheduled Areas Status
Notes: This figure shows how a village’s ST population share (in 1991 and 2001) aﬀects its likelihood of
receiving Scheduled Areas status. Results attest to the haphazard assignment of Scheduled Areas, as they
show that there is not a discontinuous jump in Scheduled Areas status where Scheduled Tribes constitute
more than 50% of a village’s total population.
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the population of Chota Nagpur, and 44.67% of that of Santal Parganas was made up of
Scheduled Tribals. Had the Census takers adopted the definitions used by the British in
1872, the percentage figures would have been 45.79% and 55.21% respectively” (Corbridge,
Jewitt and Kumar, 2004, 64).30
A.6.2 Which Areas are Scheduled?
In practice, in Jharkhand today, most Scheduled Areas are assigned at the unit of district but
some blocks are assigned as Scheduled Areas within Nonscheduled districts and some village-
clusters are Scheduled within Nonscheduled blocks. With reference to earlier suggested
criteria for which regions should be Scheduled: Jharkhand does not follow the fifty-percent
rule as a criterion for Scheduling Areas. With no modifications in scheduling at the district-
level, the Scheduled Areas assigned for Jharkhand (then Bihar) in 1950 have remained almost
completely unchanged to present.31 The Scheduled Areas of Jharkhand were re-aﬃrmed after
being assigned in 1950 in the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation of 1969 and again in 1977
and 2007.
30It is not exactly clear why certain groups were re-classified or if there was a clear method-
ology taken. Corbridge argues that some because some “ ‘aboriginals’ had gained employ-
ment in the mining or industrial sectors was taken as evidence of their ‘detribalisation”’
(Corbridge, Jewitt and Kumar, 2004, 64). Possibly the Government of Bihar thought de-
scheduling some communities and areas would diminish the possibility that the mineral-rich
region of Jharkhand would gain independent statehood.
31The only exceptions are the Scheduling of Bhandaria block of Garhwa district in 1977
and the Scheduling of two village-clusters, both within Satbarwa block in 2007.
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B Data Construction
B.1 Creating an all-India dataset with NREGS, census, and elec-
tion data sources
Because we hope this dataset and our procedures will be of use to other researchers we
describe this process in detail:
1. Download the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset for In-
dia (SHRUG), including available data from 1991-2011 Censuses and keys to match
villages (N ≈ 647, 000) with 2001 and 2011 raw Census shape files (Asher and Novosad,
2019b).32
2. Download and combine village-cluster unit state datasets on NREGS from the MGN-
REGA Public Data Portal.33
3. Build a village/village-cluster directory by downloading and combining individual block-
level directory files from from the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation.34
4. Extract and combine Census shape files using ArcGIS, to form spatially referenced
(longitudes and latitudes) datasets of villages in the 2001 and 2011 Indian Censuses.35
32The SHRUG dataset may be accessed at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DPESAK.
33The MGNREGA Public Data Portal may be accessed at: mnregaweb4.nic.in/
netnrega/dynamic2/dynamicreport_new4.aspx.
34We access the data from http://indiawater.gov.in/imisreports/nrdwpmain.aspx
at the National Rural Drinking Water Programme, Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanita-
tion (Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, 2014).
35We obtained Census data from New York University and Stanford University libraries,
which licensed the data from InfoMap India (https://www.mlinfomap.com/).
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5. Homogenize district and state names from NREGS dataset to the Water Ministry
directory using a listing of all changes in district names and alternate spellings.36 This
allows matching of the NREGS dataset more eﬃciently.
6. Fuzzy match SHRID village names to the directory, and then NREGS village-cluster
names to the directory. The directory provides a common reference for the two
datasets.37
7. Add Scheduled Areas reservation status to the village dataset (see Appendix B.2 for
more on Scheduled Areas reservation status construction).
8. Add assembly constituency-candidate level electoral records to the village dataset by
locating each village within an assembly constituency using the village’s latitude and
longitude.38
9. Merge the dataset with Census 2001 and Census 2011 data using match keys from the
SHRID dataset.
B.2 Identifying Scheduled Areas
Data on Scheduled Areas status was obtained from the government of India’s Ministry of
Tribal Aﬀairs. The websites from which we obtained data in 2014 for eight of the nine states
36For this, we rely on a compilation of all name changes between 2001 and 2011 available
from (Statoids, N.d.), at http://www.statoids.com/yin.html.
37We used Stata’s reclink command to carry out the fuzzy match. Other commands
commonly used to fuzzy match string variables such as soundex are not useful in the Indian
context because they rely on phonetic merging.
38Election data was downloaded from Election Commission of India (2014), at http:
//eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx. We used the Spatial Join command
in ArcGIS to carry out this procedure.
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Table A2: Balance Table: Matched Villages Across India
Diﬀerence p-value Unmatched Matched
Scheduled Areas 0.002 0.181 57457 216569
Population Index (Shrug, 1991-2001) 0.036 0.000 42765 213059
Minority Index (Shrug, 1991-2001) -0.000 0.937 42765 213059
Public Goods Index (Shrug, 1991-2001) 0.116 0.000 42754 213048
Vulnerable Index (Shrug, 1991-2001) -0.074 0.000 44197 213404
Notes : This table presents balance on variables that appear in both 1991 and 2001
Census waves between villages we are able to match in our dataset and those that remain
unmatched. The ‘Diﬀerence’ column represents the eﬀect of Matched on each outcome in
rows. Importantly, matched villages are not more likely to be Scheduled Areas than are
unmatched villages.
in our sample have since been retired, though they can be accessed today using Internet
archive website The Wayback Machine. Below, we provide original links, as well as links
that can still be used today to access the sites, for each of the eight states.
Andhra Pradesh
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinAndhraPradeshSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090711/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinAndhraPradeshSSAreas.aspx
Gujarat
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinGujarat.aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090722/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinGujarat.aspx
Jharkhand
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinBiharSSAreas.aspx
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• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090717/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinBiharSSAreas.aspx
Himachal Pradesh
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinHimachalPradeshSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090727/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinHimachalPradeshSSAreas.aspx
Maharashtra
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinMaharashtraSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090843/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinMaharashtraSSAreas.aspx
Madhya Pradesh
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinMadhyaPradeshSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090732/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinMadhyaPradeshSSAreas.aspx
Odisha
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinOrissaSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140818090738/http://tribal.nic.
in:80/Content/ScheduledAreasinOrissaSSAreas.aspx
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Rajasthan
• Original link: http://tribal.nic.in/Content/ScheduledAreasinRajasthanSSAreas.
aspx
• Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20140904021414/http://tribal.nic.
in/Content/ScheduledAreasinRajasthanSSAreas.aspx
Information on Scheduled Areas in all states, including the ninth in our sample, Chhat-
tisgarh, may also be found in Annexure-II of “Statistical Profile of Scheduled Tribes in India
(2013),” released by the Ministry of Tribal Aﬀairs Statistical Division and accessible here:
https://tribal.nic.in/ST/StatisticalProfileofSTs2013.pdf.
B.2.1 Verifying our Identification of Scheduled Areas and our spatial (longi-
tudes and latitudes) data
.
To verify that we correctly identified Scheduled Areas, and more generally that our spatial
(longitudes and latitudes) data are accurate, we can compare our map of Scheduled Areas
that we generated using our data (Figure 2) to an oﬃcial government map.39 In Figure A4,
we reproduce our map and compare it to the government map. We can see that our map
closely matches the government map, but that ours provides more fine-grained information,
bolstering our confidence in our data collection methods.
39This map can be accessed at http://pesadarpan.gov.in/en_US/fifth-schedule-
areas/-/asset_publisher
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Figure A4: Validating Spatial Data and Scheduled Area Identification
(a) Our Map
(Coding at Block Level)
(b) Government Map
(Coding at District Level)
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C Summary Statistics, Balance, and Sorting
C.1 Summary Statistics
Table A3: Summary Statistics for 2001 and 1991 Census Datat
(1) (2) (3)
non-Scheduled Areas Scheduled Areas Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Population Index (Census, 2001) -0.06 0.89 -0.08 0.92 0.02∗ (1.86)
Minority Index (Census, 2001) -0.01 0.91 0.00 0.95 -0.02 (-1.58)
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) 0.08 0.79 0.05 0.77 0.03∗∗∗ (3.04)
Education Index (Census, 2001) -0.05 0.85 -0.06 0.92 0.01 (0.94)
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.02 1.11 0.02 1.09 -0.01 (-0.54)
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.04 0.89 0.31 0.92 -0.26∗∗∗ (-25.75)
Communications Index (Census, 2001) -0.07 0.98 -0.18 0.92 0.11∗∗∗ (10.28)
Banking Index (Census, 2001) 0.00 1.20 -0.10 0.58 0.10∗∗∗ (10.19)
Road Index (Census, 2001) 0.03 0.97 0.05 0.89 -0.03∗∗∗ (-2.73)
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.06 1.48 0.22 0.57 -0.16∗∗∗ (-13.57)
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.12 0.68 -0.14 0.66 0.02∗∗∗ (2.67)
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.02 0.96 -0.01 0.98 -0.01 (-0.88)
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.10 1.05 0.12 1.06 -0.02∗ (-1.73)
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.08 0.77 -0.10 0.77 0.01∗ (1.71)
Share SC (Census, 1991) 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.02∗∗∗ (16.35)
Share SC (Census, 2001) 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.02∗∗∗ (15.46)
Share ST (Census, 1991) 0.48 0.39 0.58 0.37 -0.11∗∗∗ (-25.31)
Share ST (Census, 2001) 0.47 0.38 0.58 0.37 -0.11∗∗∗ (-25.20)
Village Longitude 79.47 4.72 79.56 4.81 -0.08 (-1.57)
Village Latitude 21.88 2.01 21.90 1.96 -0.01 (-0.56)
Bandwidth (in Kilometers) 4.87 2.87 4.36 2.79 0.51∗∗∗ (16.33)
AC Reserved, ST 0.46 0.50 0.61 0.49 -0.15∗∗∗ (-27.96)
ST Majority 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.49 -0.12∗∗∗ (-22.09)
Observations 18375 14266 32641
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on 2001 and 1991 Census variables for treated and un-
treated units using our 10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in our
main analyses. Column 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of variables in non-Scheduled Areas,
column 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of variables in Scheduled Areas, and Column 3 presents
the diﬀerence (column 1 - column 2) and t-statistic from a two-sample t test.
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Table A4: Summary Statistics: NREGS and Census 2011 Employment Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
non-Scheduled Areas Scheduled Areas Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Logged (Workdays + 1) 8.06 2.51 8.10 2.66 -0.04 (-1.52)
Logged (Workdays ST + 1) 6.34 3.16 6.86 3.15 -0.52∗∗∗ (-14.77)
Logged (Workdays SC + 1) 4.84 3.12 4.66 3.15 0.18∗∗∗ (5.14)
Logged (Workdays Others + 1) 6.68 2.76 6.42 2.87 0.27∗∗∗ (8.45)
Workdays 9748.16 10499.24 11467.71 15104.98 -1719.54∗∗∗ (-11.60)
Workdays - ST 4306.59 6367.91 6851.69 12279.96 -2545.10∗∗∗ (-22.52)
Workdays - SC 1259.99 2130.40 1139.16 2032.10 120.82∗∗∗ (5.22)
Workdays - Others 4181.59 6448.20 3476.85 5384.62 704.74∗∗∗ (10.75)
Total Workers 5.85 1.05 5.83 1.06 0.02 (1.33)
Total Workers - Men 5.30 1.04 5.25 1.06 0.04∗∗∗ (3.79)
Total Workers - Women 4.89 1.22 4.94 1.17 -0.05∗∗∗ (-3.69)
Main Workers 5.15 1.51 5.07 1.59 0.07∗∗∗ (4.25)
Main Workers - Men 4.78 1.45 4.70 1.53 0.09∗∗∗ (5.24)
Main Workers - Women 3.76 1.74 3.75 1.77 0.02 (0.80)
Marginal Workers 4.20 1.71 4.24 1.69 -0.04∗∗ (-2.08)
Marginal Workers - Men 3.28 1.62 3.30 1.60 -0.02 (-1.24)
Marginal Workers - Women 3.64 1.72 3.71 1.69 -0.07∗∗∗ (-3.88)
Other Workers 3.01 1.58 2.87 1.64 0.15∗∗∗ (8.07)
Other Workers - Men 2.72 1.60 2.56 1.65 0.16∗∗∗ (8.69)
Other Workers - Women 1.80 1.25 1.76 1.26 0.04∗∗∗ (2.77)
Observations 18375 14266 32641
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on NREGS and 2011 Census employment outcome vari-
ables for treated and untreated units using our 10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on
the same sample as in our main analyses. Column 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of variables
in non-Scheduled Areas, column 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of variables in Scheduled Areas,
and Column 3 presents the diﬀerence (column 1 - column 2) and t-statistic from a two-sample t test.
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Table A5: Summary Statistics and Balance for 2011 Public Goods Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
non-Scheduled Areas Scheduled Areas Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Population Index (Census, 2001) 0.77 1.69 1.01 1.96 -0.23∗∗∗ (-3.25)
Minority Index (Census, 2001) 0.71 1.58 0.93 1.83 -0.23∗∗∗ (-3.41)
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) 0.19 0.76 0.11 0.79 0.08∗∗∗ (2.76)
Education Index (Census, 2001) 0.64 1.69 0.81 1.96 -0.17∗∗ (-2.36)
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.68 2.80 0.91 2.49 -0.23∗∗ (-2.23)
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.30 0.77 0.68 0.84 -0.39∗∗∗ (-12.24)
Communications Index (Census, 2001) 0.44 1.40 0.50 1.47 -0.06 (-1.11)
Banking Index (Census, 2001) 0.41 1.52 0.46 1.29 -0.05 (-0.98)
Road Index (Census, 2001) 0.09 1.09 0.08 0.93 0.01 (0.24)
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.08 1.52 0.32 0.60 -0.23∗∗∗ (-5.64)
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) 0.21 0.96 0.29 1.12 -0.08∗∗ (-2.07)
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.76 1.60 1.01 1.74 -0.25∗∗∗ (-3.86)
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.04 1.00 -0.01 0.91 0.06 (1.59)
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.45 1.54 0.55 1.54 -0.10∗ (-1.66)
Share SC (Census, 1991) 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.02∗∗∗ (5.11)
Share SC (Census, 2001) 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.02∗∗∗ (4.47)
Share ST (Census, 1991) 0.35 0.34 0.44 0.36 -0.08∗∗∗ (-6.01)
Share ST (Census, 2001) 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.35 -0.08∗∗∗ (-6.20)
Observations 1632 1117 2749
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on 2001 and 1991 Census variables for treated and un-
treated units using our 10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in
our analysis on 2011 public goods (Census market villages). Column 1 presents the mean and standard
deviation of variables in non-Scheduled Areas, column 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of vari-
ables in Scheduled Areas, and Column 3 presents the diﬀerence (column 1 - column 2) and t-statistic from
a two-sample t test.
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Table A6: Summary Statistics for 2011 Census Market Village Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
non-Scheduled Areas Scheduled Areas Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Overall Public Goods Index 0.51 0.21 0.55 0.19 -0.04∗∗∗ (-5.52)
Roads Index 0.49 0.25 0.52 0.23 -0.04∗∗∗ (-3.84)
All Weather Road (Y/N) 0.78 0.41 0.83 0.38 -0.04∗∗∗ (-2.93)
National Highway (Y/N) 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 -0.01 (-0.75)
State Highway (Y/N) 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 -0.03∗∗ (-2.04)
Major District Road (Y/N) 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 -0.03 (-1.62)
Other District Road (Y/N) 0.62 0.49 0.67 0.47 -0.05∗∗∗ (-2.89)
Gravel Road (Y/N) 0.87 0.34 0.91 0.28 -0.04∗∗∗ (-3.69)
Water Index 0.53 0.21 0.56 0.19 -0.03∗∗∗ (-4.04)
Handpump (Y/N) 0.89 0.31 0.91 0.28 -0.02∗∗ (-2.16)
Tap Water Treated (Y/N) 0.30 0.46 0.37 0.48 -0.07∗∗∗ (-3.92)
Tank, Pond, Lake (Y/N) 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.02 (0.86)
Covered Well (Y/N) 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 -0.05∗∗∗ (-3.26)
Uncovered Well (Y/N) 0.79 0.40 0.82 0.38 -0.03∗ (-1.80)
Irrigation Index 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.36 -0.02 (-1.43)
Tubewell/Borehole (Y/N) 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50 -0.02 (-0.79)
River/Canal (Y/N) 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 -0.03 (-1.33)
Electricity Index 0.70 0.38 0.72 0.36 -0.02∗ (-1.71)
Electricity for Agriculture Use (Y/N) 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.46 -0.03∗ (-1.87)
Electricity for Domestic Use (Y/N) 0.85 0.36 0.87 0.33 -0.02∗ (-1.73)
Electricity for Commercial Use (Y/N) 0.57 0.49 0.59 0.49 -0.02 (-0.91)
Communications Index 0.46 0.34 0.54 0.34 -0.08∗∗∗ (-6.20)
Post Oﬃce (Y/N) 0.33 0.47 0.43 0.49 -0.10∗∗∗ (-5.37)
Post and Telegraph Oﬃce (Y/N) 0.24 0.43 0.32 0.47 -0.08∗∗∗ (-4.45)
Telephone (Y/N) 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49 -0.07∗∗∗ (-3.67)
Mobile Coverage (Y/N) 0.75 0.43 0.83 0.38 -0.08∗∗∗ (-5.00)
Education Index 0.47 0.26 0.53 0.25 -0.05∗∗∗ (-5.36)
Primary School (Y/N) 0.90 0.30 0.95 0.22 -0.05∗∗∗ (-4.71)
Middle School (Y/N) 0.74 0.44 0.82 0.38 -0.08∗∗∗ (-4.95)
Secondary School (Y/N) 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.50 -0.09∗∗∗ (-4.42)
Senior Secondary School (Y/N) 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.46 -0.05∗∗∗ (-2.73)
College (Y/N) 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 -0.01 (-0.83)
Observations 1632 1117 2749
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on 2011 public goods Census variables for treated and
untreated units using our 10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as
in our analysis on 2011 public goods (Census market villages). Column 1 presents the mean and standard
deviation of variables in non-Scheduled Areas, column 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of variables
in Scheduled Areas, and Column 3 presents the diﬀerence (column 1 - column 2) and t-statistic from a two-
sample t test.
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Table A7: Summary Statistics for Assembly Constituency (AC) ST Reservation,
Scheduled Areas
(1) (2) (3)
non-ST Reserved ST Reserved Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Population Index (Census, 2001) -0.09 1.04 -0.07 0.84 -0.02 (-1.30)
Minority Index (Census, 2001) -0.12 0.97 0.08 0.93 -0.21∗∗∗ (-12.58)
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) 0.17 0.83 -0.02 0.72 0.18∗∗∗ (13.55)
Education Index (Census, 2001) -0.11 1.04 -0.03 0.84 -0.08∗∗∗ (-5.06)
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) -0.01 1.28 0.05 0.95 -0.05∗∗∗ (-2.75)
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.37 0.81 0.26 0.98 0.11∗∗∗ (7.26)
Communications Index (Census, 2001) -0.22 0.97 -0.15 0.89 -0.07∗∗∗ (-4.51)
Banking Index (Census, 2001) -0.08 0.62 -0.11 0.56 0.03∗∗∗ (2.75)
Road Index (Census, 2001) 0.04 0.99 0.06 0.81 -0.02 (-1.51)
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.06 0.49 0.33 0.60 -0.27∗∗∗ (-29.51)
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.17 0.69 -0.13 0.64 -0.05∗∗∗ (-4.19)
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.12 0.94 0.06 1.00 -0.18∗∗∗ (-10.84)
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.18 1.12 0.08 1.01 0.11∗∗∗ (5.76)
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.04 0.89 -0.13 0.68 0.09∗∗∗ (6.70)
Population Perc SC (1991) 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.04∗∗∗ (17.35)
Population Perc SC (2001) 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.04∗∗∗ (19.85)
Population Perc ST (1991) 0.42 0.39 0.68 0.33 -0.26∗∗∗ (-41.56)
Population Perc ST (2001) 0.42 0.38 0.68 0.32 -0.26∗∗∗ (-42.32)
Village Longitude 81.71 5.22 78.20 3.97 3.52∗∗∗ (42.89)
Village Latitude 22.04 2.25 21.80 1.75 0.24∗∗∗ (6.78)
Bandwidth (in Kilometers) 4.39 2.78 4.34 2.80 0.06 (1.20)
Observations 5525 8741 14266
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on 2001 and 1991 Census variables for Scheduled Areas
villages with (ST Reserved) and without (non-ST Reserved) overlapping AC-level ST reservations using our
10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in our analyses. Column 1
presents the mean and standard deviation of variables in non-ST reserved areas, column 2 presents the mean
and standard deviation of variables in ST reserved areas, and Column 3 presents the diﬀerence (column 1 -
column 2) and t-statistic from a two-sample t test.
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Table A8: Summary Statistics for Assembly Constituency (AC) ST Reservation,
Non-Scheduled Areas
(1) (2) (3)
non-ST Reserved ST Reserved Simple Diﬀerence
mean sd mean sd b t
Population Index (Census, 2001) 0.00 1.00 -0.13 0.72 0.13∗∗∗ (9.99)
Minority Index (Census, 2001) -0.09 0.88 0.08 0.94 -0.18∗∗∗ (-13.02)
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) 0.08 0.84 0.08 0.72 0.01 (0.46)
Education Index (Census, 2001) -0.05 0.87 -0.05 0.83 -0.00 (-0.22)
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.02 1.30 0.01 0.84 0.01 (0.38)
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.06 0.86 0.03 0.93 0.03∗∗ (2.17)
Communications Index (Census, 2001) 0.02 1.01 -0.18 0.93 0.20∗∗∗ (14.11)
Banking Index (Census, 2001) -0.03 0.67 0.04 1.61 -0.07∗∗∗ (-3.84)
Road Index (Census, 2001) -0.01 0.95 0.07 0.98 -0.09∗∗∗ (-5.98)
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) -0.05 0.76 0.20 2.01 -0.25∗∗∗ (-10.77)
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.08 0.66 -0.17 0.69 0.09∗∗∗ (9.27)
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.04 0.97 0.00 0.95 -0.04∗∗ (-2.55)
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.08 1.04 0.12 1.06 -0.04∗∗ (-2.39)
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.00 0.91 -0.18 0.56 0.17∗∗∗ (15.79)
Population Perc SC (1991) 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.05∗∗∗ (22.33)
Population Perc SC (2001) 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05∗∗∗ (22.49)
Population Perc ST (1991) 0.30 0.34 0.68 0.33 -0.39∗∗∗ (-77.89)
Population Perc ST (2001) 0.30 0.33 0.68 0.33 -0.38∗∗∗ (-77.62)
Village Longitude 80.21 5.06 78.61 4.12 1.59∗∗∗ (23.48)
Village Latitude 22.00 2.13 21.74 1.84 0.26∗∗∗ (8.81)
Bandwidth (in Kilometers) 4.96 2.87 4.77 2.86 0.20∗∗∗ (4.69)
Observations 9937 8438 18375
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on 2001 and 1991 Census variables for non-Scheduled Areas
villages with (ST Reserved) and without (non-ST Reserved) overlapping AC-level ST reservations using our
10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in our analyses. Column 1
presents the mean and standard deviation of variables in non-ST reserved areas, column 2 presents the mean
and standard deviation of variables in ST reserved areas, and Column 3 presents the diﬀerence (column 1 -
column 2) and t-statistic from a two-sample t test.
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C.2 Balance
Table A9: Balance Table - OLS
Diﬀerence p-value GPs Villages
Population Index (Census, 2001) -0.084 0.000 72521 207221
Minority Index (Census, 2001) 0.034 0.000 72521 207221
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) -0.068 0.000 72521 207221
Education Index (Census, 2001) -0.024 0.000 72521 207221
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.007 0.211 72521 207221
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.207 0.000 72521 207221
Communications Index (Census, 2001) -0.199 0.000 72521 207221
Banking Index (Census, 2001) -0.125 0.000 72521 207221
Road Index (Census, 2001) -0.005 0.520 72521 207221
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.156 0.000 72521 207221
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.186 0.000 72521 207221
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.021 0.004 72521 207221
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.100 0.000 72521 207221
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.079 0.000 72521 207221
Share SC (Census, 1991) -0.097 0.000 72521 207221
Share SC (Census, 2001) -0.099 0.000 72521 207221
Share ST (Census, 1991) 0.433 0.000 72521 207221
Share ST (Census, 2001) 0.429 0.000 72521 207221
Notes: This table presents balance between treated and untreated units using our OLS specification
on the same sample as our OLS analysis (see Appendix D.1). Standard errors are clustered at the gram
panchayat (GP) level. Controls include state fixed eﬀects. The ‘Diﬀerence’ column presents the treatment
eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on each Index in rows.
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Table A10: Balance Table - 10 km RD
Diﬀerence p-value GPs Villages
Population Index (Census, 2001) -0.024 0.035 13338 32641
Minority Index (Census, 2001) 0.020 0.103 13338 32641
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) -0.025 0.025 13338 32641
Education Index (Census, 2001) 0.003 0.773 13338 32641
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.011 0.376 13338 32641
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.214 0.000 13338 32641
Communications Index (Census, 2001) -0.092 0.000 13338 32641
Banking Index (Census, 2001) -0.116 0.000 13338 32641
Road Index (Census, 2001) -0.000 0.997 13338 32641
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.156 0.000 13338 32641
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.016 0.069 13338 32641
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.003 0.795 13338 32641
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.023 0.132 13338 32641
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.011 0.253 13338 32641
Share SC (Census, 1991) -0.022 0.000 13338 32641
Share SC (Census, 2001) -0.021 0.000 13338 32641
Share ST (Census, 1991) 0.110 0.000 13338 32641
Share ST (Census, 2001) 0.109 0.000 13338 32641
Notes: This table presents balance between treated and untreated units using our 10 km geographic
regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in our main analyses. Standard errors are
clustered at the gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include state fixed eﬀects and a geographic control
function. The ‘Diﬀerence’ column presents the treatment eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on each Index in rows.
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Table A11: Balance Table on 2001 Census for 2011 Market Villages - 10 km RD
Diﬀerence p-value GPs Villages
Population Index (Census, 2001) 0.002 0.974 2223 2749
Minority Index (Census, 2001) 0.060 0.292 2223 2749
Vulnerable Pop Index (Census, 2001) -0.044 0.136 2223 2749
Education Index (Census, 2001) 0.097 0.128 2223 2749
Medical Facilities Index (Census, 2001) 0.061 0.565 2223 2749
Water Index (Census, 2001) 0.309 0.000 2223 2749
Communications Index (Census, 2001) -0.060 0.162 2223 2749
Banking Index (Census, 2001) -0.079 0.125 2223 2749
Road Index (Census, 2001) -0.041 0.312 2223 2749
Urbanization Index (Census, 2001) 0.193 0.000 2223 2749
Irrigation Index (Census, 2001) -0.035 0.317 2223 2749
Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) -0.000 0.995 2223 2749
Marginal Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.032 0.365 2223 2749
Non-Agricultural Worker Index (Census, 2001) 0.040 0.451 2223 2749
Share SC (Census, 1991) -0.018 0.000 2223 2749
Share SC (Census, 2001) -0.015 0.000 2223 2749
Share ST (Census, 1991) 0.090 0.000 2223 2749
Share ST (Census, 2001) 0.090 0.000 2223 2749
Notes: This table presents balance between treated and untreated units using our 10 km geographic
regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as in our analysis on 2011 public goods (Census
market villages). Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include state
fixed eﬀects and a geographic control function. The ‘Diﬀerence’ column presents the treatment eﬀect of
Scheduled Areas on each Index in rows.
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Figure A5: Geographic RD Balance
Notes: This figure probes the robustness of main treatment eﬀects when the sample is restricted to various
degrees of imbalance in pre-treatment Census 2001 indices. We proceed as follows: first we calculate a mean
index of all 14 Census 2001 indices. Then for each district in the data, we calculate the degree of imbalance
on this global mean balance index by regressing it on our standard geographic RD regression. Then we rank
the districts starting at the least imbalanced on the left of the figures above to most imbalanced as we move
towards the right on the x-axis. Treatment eﬀects (on the left y-axis) are shown by the black dots for each
sample while the gray area plots the associated 95 percent confidence interval. The amount of data in each
sample is shown on the right y-axis. The green line traces the cumulative distribution of districts in the
sample as more and more districts are added to the analysis. The red line traces the cumulative density of
villages in the analysis. Overall, we see that our results are robust and stabilize even with only 30 percent
of the districts in the analysis.
A30
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Po
pu
lat
ion
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
M
ino
rit
y I
nd
ex
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Vu
lne
ra
ble
 P
op
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Ed
uc
at
ion
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
M
ed
ica
l F
ac
ilit
ies
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
W
at
er
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
ns
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Ba
nk
ing
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Ro
ad
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Ur
ba
niz
at
ion
 In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Irr
iga
tio
n 
In
de
x (
Ce
ns
us
, 2
00
1)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Ag
ric
ult
ur
al 
W
or
ke
r I
nd
ex
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
M
ar
gin
al 
W
or
ke
r I
nd
ex
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
No
n-
Ag
ric
ult
ur
al 
W
or
ke
r I
nd
ex
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Sh
ar
e 
SC
 (C
en
su
s, 
19
91
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Sh
ar
e 
SC
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Sh
ar
e 
ST
 (C
en
su
s, 
19
91
)
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Treatment effects
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in 
Km
Sh
ar
e 
ST
 (C
en
su
s, 
20
01
)
F
ig
u
re
A
6:
E
v
o
lu
ti
o
n
o
f
1
9
9
1
a
n
d
2
0
0
1
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
A
cr
o
ss
D
iﬀ
e
re
n
t
B
a
n
d
w
id
th
s
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
fi
gu
re
sh
ow
s
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
ch
ed
u
le
d
A
re
a
s
o
n
a
ll
1
4
in
d
ic
es
(a
s
w
el
l
as
19
9
1
an
d
20
0
1
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
sh
a
re
s)
at
va
ri
o
u
s
b
a
n
d
w
id
th
s.
W
e
fi
n
d
th
at
th
e
sm
al
l
im
b
a
la
n
ce
s
th
at
w
e
d
o
ob
se
rv
e
d
o
n
o
t
in
cr
ea
se
,
b
u
t
in
m
o
st
ca
se
s
te
n
d
to
w
ar
d
ze
ro
,
as
th
e
b
a
n
d
w
id
th
o
f
an
a
ly
si
s
sh
ri
n
k
s.
A31
C.3 Over-time Changes and Sorting
Total Population
Total Rural Pop
Literate Population
Num of Households
Area of Village
Paved Road
Dirt Road
Power Supply
Power Supply Agriculture
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Schd Area effect on: (2001 Value - 1991 Value) / 1991 Value
Figure A7: Over-time Changes Across 1991-2001 Censuses
Notes: This figure shows the treatment eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on over-time changes in variables that
we are able to track across both the 1991 and 2001 Censuses. We use our 10 km geographic regression
discontinuity specification on the same sample as our main analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the
gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion and state
fixed eﬀects. We find limited evidence of diﬀerential over-time changes across these variables in Scheduled
versus non-Scheduled Areas.
A32
Table A12: Sorting Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share ST Share ST Share ST Share ST Share ST
2001 2001 2011 2011 2011
Scheduled Areas 0.099*** 0.005*** 0.101*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
ST Share, 1991 0.941*** 0.412***
(0.002) (0.023)
ST Share, 2001 0.953*** 0.557***
(0.002) (0.023)
Control Mean 0.474 0.474 0.480 0.480 0.480
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. This table shows the treatment eﬀect of Scheduled Areas
on the ST share of the population in diﬀerent Census years and controlling for diﬀerent preceding
years. We use our 10 km geographic regression discontinuity specification on the same sample as our
main analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include
state fixed eﬀects, all 14 baseline indices, and a geographic control function. The table shows that
once we account for ST population shares in 1991 and 2001, there remain no substantive diﬀerences
in ST population across treated and control areas in 2011. We therefore control for 1991 and 2001
ST population shares in all of our reported analysis in the revised manuscript.
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C.4 Density of Distance to Threshold
Figure A8: Cumulative Density of Distance to the Threshold
Notes: This figure plots the density of observations at diﬀerent kilometer distances to the geographic regres-
sion discontinuity threshold. We include indicators for the bandwidth used in the paper (10 kilometers) and
the mean and median distances to the threshold for reference.
A34
D Additional Results and Robustness of Main Eﬀects
D.1 OLS Main Results
A naive ordinary least squares model compares Scheduled and non-Scheduled villages with
state fixed eﬀects and village level controls from the 2001 and 1991 Indian Censuses with
the following specification:
yvgs = as + γScheduled Areavgs + Z
′
vgsφ+ #vgs (2)
Table A13: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 0.020** 0.596*** -0.436*** -0.347***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 635.522 118.588 113.634 403.301
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 0.119*** 0.627*** -0.337*** -0.221***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 193.144 41.606 37.646 113.892
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas 0.140*** 0.794*** -0.524*** -0.264***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 8660.401 1811.806 1702.934 5145.661
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion and state fixed eﬀects.
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D.2 Functional Form and Bandwidth
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Figure A9: RD Robustness by Bandwidth and Functional Form
Notes: Plots results in Table 2 by control function and bandwidth with 90% confidence intervals.
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D.3 Controlling for Number of Matched Villages within a GP
One concern with the approach taken for the NREGS analysis could be that the number
of villages within each gram panchayat diﬀers between Scheduled and non-Scheduled Areas.
Were this the case, then assigning all villages within a gram panchayat the same values could
bias our comparison of Scheduled and non-Scheduled Areas. To account for this possibility,
we show in table A14 that our main results are robust, both substantively and statistically,
when we include fixed eﬀects for the number of gram panchayat villages.
Table A14: Main NREGS Results with Num Matched Villages per GP FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas -0.007 0.199*** -0.037 -0.106***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas -0.001 0.193*** -0.016 -0.094***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.020 0.230*** 0.010 -0.133***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.052) (0.044)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state and number of GP
villages fixed eﬀects, and a flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the
form: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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D.4 Non-Logged Outcomes
Table A15: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 57.547*** 140.433*** -28.147*** -54.739***
(5.851) (4.646) (1.933) (3.862)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 635.522 118.588 113.634 403.301
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 58.172*** 75.639*** -5.712*** -11.756***
(3.351) (2.661) (0.810) (1.696)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 193.144 41.606 37.646 113.892
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas 3979.138*** 4432.663*** -145.964*** -307.561***
(231.931) (177.965) (41.191) (97.365)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 8660.401 1811.806 1702.934 5145.661
# GPs 72521 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221 207221
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion and state fixed eﬀects.
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Table A16: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 21.815*** 45.936*** -6.693** -17.428***
(7.878) (6.141) (2.702) (5.626)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 23.230*** 30.633*** -1.041 -6.362***
(4.224) (3.143) (1.096) (2.455)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas 1706.983*** 2118.336*** -39.018 -372.335***
(269.853) (203.401) (49.454) (129.318)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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D.5 Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformed Outcomes
Table A17: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas -0.002 0.213*** -0.040 -0.105***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.034) (0.025)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas -0.001 0.212*** -0.016 -0.100***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.021 0.241*** 0.006 -0.138***
(0.038) (0.048) (0.057) (0.048)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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D.6 Optimal Bandwidths by Outcome
Table A18: Optimal Bandwidths by Outcome
Bandwidth GPs
Jobcards 28.7 217144
Jobcards, ST 23.7 217144
Jobcards, SC 26.4 217144
Jobcards, non-SC/ST 26.1 217144
Worked HH 21.6 217144
Worked HH, ST 26.7 217144
Worked HH, SC 27.1 217144
Worked HH, non-SC/ST 31.7 217144
Workdays 24.0 217144
Workdays, ST 28.0 217144
Workdays, SC 25.9 217144
Workdays, Other 36.0 217144
Workdays, Women 21.6 217144
Workdays, Men 23.9 217144
Jobcards (non-logged) 22.9 217144
Jobcards, ST (non-logged) 20.9 217144
Jobcards, SC (non-logged) 28.0 217144
Jobcards, non-SC/ST (non-logged) 23.7 217144
Worked HH (non-logged) 21.9 217144
Worked HH, ST (non-logged) 24.7 217144
Worked HH, SC (non-logged) 22.8 217144
Worked HH, non-SC/ST (non-logged) 20.6 217144
Workdays (non-logged) 23.5 217144
Workdays, ST (non-logged) 26.3 217144
Workdays, SC (non-logged) 19.2 217144
Workdays, non-SC/ST (non-logged) 26.3 217144
Workdays, Women (non-logged) 24.6 217144
Workdays, Men (non-logged) 20.8 217144
Notes: This table presents optimal bandwidths by outcome variable. We include a geographic control
function. Optimal bandwidths are calculated using the Stata package rdrobust (Calonico and Titiunik,
2017). The reported bandwidth is the “MSE-optimal point estimation using a common bandwidth on both
sides of the cutoﬀ” (Calonico and Titiunik (2017), p. 400). The estimation uses regularization methods,
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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D.7 Gender NREGS Results
Table A19: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS by Gender (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Women Men
Scheduled Areas 0.140*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 8660.401 4363.856 4296.546
# GPs 72521 72521 72521
# Villages 207221 207221 207221
H0: γ(2) - γ(3) = 0 p < 0.98
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village shares, and state fixed eﬀects.
Table A20: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS by Gender (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Women Men
Scheduled Areas -0.010 0.016 0.009
(0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4032.491 5715.673
# GPs 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641
H0: γ(2) - γ(3) = 0 p = 0.707
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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Figure A11: RD Results by Bandwidth
Notes: We plot the eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on workdays for women and men at diﬀerent kilometer band-
widths and with 90% confidence intervals.
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D.8 PMGSY Eﬀects: RD Sample Only
Figure A12: The Eﬀect of the introduction of PESA election on PMGSY Roads
(RD Sample)
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Notes : This figure plots binned means of completed PMGSY roads by Scheduled Area status
on a dataset of villages in our RD sample that is residualized for village fixed eﬀects.
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D.9 State by State Analysis
Table A21: Eﬀects on Logged Jobcards (State by State, 10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Sch × Andhra Pradesh 0.036 0.455*** -0.675*** -0.876***
(0.041) (0.129) (0.119) (0.159)
Sch × Chattisgarh -0.042 0.070 0.062 0.052
(0.027) (0.054) (0.081) (0.049)
Sch × Gujrat 0.151*** 0.495*** -0.148** -0.118*
(0.044) (0.065) (0.075) (0.067)
Sch × Himachal Pradesh -0.522*** 0.923*** 0.514 -2.905***
(0.108) (0.310) (0.382) (0.318)
Sch × Jharkhand 0.059*** 0.500*** -0.254*** -0.019
(0.022) (0.075) (0.090) (0.050)
Sch × Maharashtra -0.159*** 0.018 0.018 0.034
(0.031) (0.058) (0.056) (0.048)
Sch × Madhya Pradesh -0.057* -0.116** 0.275*** -0.075*
(0.031) (0.045) (0.057) (0.042)
Sch × Odisha 0.079** 0.432*** -0.261** -0.141*
(0.032) (0.069) (0.103) (0.075)
Sch × Rajasthan 0.136*** 0.227* 0.046 0.146
(0.040) (0.129) (0.198) (0.128)
Controls Unlogged Means:
Andhra Pradesh 787.9 243.1 145.1 399.6
Chattisgarh 423.5 173.6 30.6 219.4
Gujrat 384.4 212.2 22.6 149.6
Himachal Pradesh 399.1 54.9 90.1 254.1
Jharkhand 985.9 283.5 120.6 581.8
Maharashtra 322.6 125.5 22.6 174.5
Madhya Pradesh 504.8 201.8 95.3 207.7
Odisha 1,107.7 459.6 195.4 452.6
Rajasthan 1,015.7 659.6 37.7 318.4
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat
(GP) level. Model is run without a constant. The interaction terms reflect the diﬀerences from mean
control values of outcome in each state. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village
proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes
(y) of the form: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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Table A22: Eﬀects on Logged Worked HH (State by State, 10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Sch × Andhra Pradesh 0.148** 0.473*** -0.560*** -0.731***
(0.059) (0.121) (0.139) (0.169)
Sch × Chattisgarh -0.032 0.161** 0.063 0.049
(0.049) (0.063) (0.087) (0.071)
Sch × Gujrat 0.013 0.140 -0.139** -0.106
(0.096) (0.087) (0.054) (0.082)
Sch × Himachal Pradesh -0.797*** 1.002*** 0.042 -3.115***
(0.165) (0.335) (0.436) (0.332)
Sch × Jharkhand -0.035 0.521*** -0.447*** -0.196***
(0.051) (0.100) (0.100) (0.069)
Sch × Maharashtra -0.305*** -0.152*** -0.086** -0.092
(0.065) (0.058) (0.042) (0.062)
Sch × Madhya Pradesh -0.017 -0.049 0.344*** -0.086**
(0.031) (0.047) (0.057) (0.043)
Sch × Odisha 0.289*** 0.595*** -0.115 0.072
(0.052) (0.082) (0.108) (0.107)
Sch × Rajasthan 0.679*** 0.789*** 0.712*** 0.888***
(0.077) (0.134) (0.187) (0.157)
Controls Unlogged Means:
Andhra Pradesh 336.5 117.1 54.4 165.0
Chattisgarh 292.4 120.7 19.2 152.5
Gujrat 68.9 38.0 4.0 26.9
Himachal Pradesh 243.4 29.1 52.5 161.8
Jharkhand 345.1 105.2 41.7 198.2
Maharashtra 66.6 28.6 4.9 33.1
Madhya Pradesh 189.6 90.3 33.9 65.4
Odisha 327.1 160.3 52.9 114.0
Rajasthan 427.9 334.8 10.5 82.6
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat
(GP) level. Model is run without a constant. The interaction terms reflect the diﬀerences from mean
control values of outcome in each state. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village
proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes
(y) of the form: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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Table A23: Eﬀects on Logged Workdays (State by State, 10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Sch × Andhra Pradesh 0.257*** 0.648*** -1.146*** -1.032***
(0.087) (0.200) (0.265) (0.287)
Sch × Chattisgarh 0.037 0.193** 0.328** 0.183*
(0.080) (0.094) (0.159) (0.102)
Sch × Gujrat -0.077 0.353** -0.300** -0.322**
(0.159) (0.152) (0.130) (0.155)
Sch × Himachal Pradesh -1.057*** 1.352** 0.020 -4.299***
(0.233) (0.557) (0.845) (0.705)
Sch × Jharkhand -0.129* 0.506*** -0.580*** -0.243***
(0.070) (0.147) (0.165) (0.090)
Sch × Maharashtra -0.419*** -0.227** -0.170* -0.072
(0.110) (0.111) (0.093) (0.115)
Sch × Madhya Pradesh -0.044 -0.101 0.537*** -0.166**
(0.049) (0.070) (0.090) (0.068)
Sch × Odisha 0.336*** 0.650*** -0.055 0.088
(0.070) (0.115) (0.156) (0.134)
Sch × Rajasthan 1.257*** 1.416*** 1.638*** 1.659***
(0.099) (0.193) (0.350) (0.194)
Controls Unlogged Means:
Andhra Pradesh 18,880.4 6,895.1 2,758.4 9,226.9
Chattisgarh 16,805.7 7,561.1 982.5 8,262.1
Gujrat 2,787.2 1,516.3 161.7 1,109.2
Himachal Pradesh 13,872.1 1,359.6 2,865.9 9,646.7
Jharkhand 15,580.7 4,548.1 1,826.7 9,206.0
Maharashtra 2,845.9 1,225.5 211.8 1,408.6
Madhya Pradesh 7,601.9 3,655.2 1,321.9 2,624.7
Odisha 13,749.2 6,829.8 2,156.7 4,762.7
Rajasthan 16,459.8 12,972.7 420.1 3,067.0
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat
(GP) level. Model is run without a constant. The interaction terms reflect the diﬀerences from mean
control values of outcome in each state. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village
proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes
(y) of the form: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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D.10 Conley Standard Errors
Table A24: Replication of Table 2 Main Eﬀects with Conley SEs (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 0.000 0.207*** -0.038 -0.098***
(0.017) (0.037) (0.039) (0.031)
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 0.009 0.203*** -0.017 -0.086**
(0.034) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039)
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.010 0.241*** 0.009 -0.125**
(0.054) (0.065) (0.066) (0.062)
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. We report Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses.
Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a flexible
function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x+ y+ x2 + y2 + xy+ x3 +
y3 + x2y + xy2.
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D.11 District-level Muslim Rural Population Controls
Table A25: Replication of Table 2 Main Eﬀects on Jobcards (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Rural Muslim Population Controls
Scheduled Areas -0.011 0.203*** -0.037 -0.120***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Including Squared Population Term
Scheduled Areas -0.011 0.202*** -0.035 -0.120***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Controlling for Population Terciles
Scheduled Areas -0.001 0.206*** -0.035 -0.100***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2. This table shows that results are robust to controlling for rural Muslim
district-level population in diﬀerent forms.
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Table A26: Replication of Table 2 Main Eﬀects on Worked HH (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Rural Muslim Population Controls
Scheduled Areas -0.020 0.179*** -0.020 -0.112***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Including Squared Population Term
Scheduled Areas -0.024 0.175*** -0.020 -0.115***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Controlling for Population Terciles
Scheduled Areas 0.006 0.202*** -0.016 -0.090***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2. This table shows that results are robust to controlling for rural Muslim
district-level population in diﬀerent forms.
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Table A27: Replication of Table 2 Main Eﬀects on Workdays (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Rural Muslim Population Controls
Scheduled Areas -0.056 0.198*** -0.006 -0.167***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.053) (0.046)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Including Squared Population Term
Scheduled Areas -0.062* 0.192*** -0.007 -0.172***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.053) (0.046)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Controlling for Population Terciles
Scheduled Areas -0.015 0.237*** 0.010 -0.130***
(0.035) (0.046) (0.053) (0.045)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2. This table shows that results are robust to controlling for rural Muslim
district-level population in diﬀerent forms.
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E Additional Results and Robustness of Electoral Mech-
anism
E.1 PESA Elections
Table A28: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS by Number of PESA Elec-
tions (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Sch Areas × 1 PESA Election 0.062*** 0.505*** -0.260*** -0.015
(0.022) (0.076) (0.090) (0.050)
Sch Areas × 2 PESA Elections -0.100*** 0.108** -0.096** -0.123***
(0.021) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Sch Areas × 3 PESA Elections 0.028 0.175*** 0.042 -0.109***
(0.020) (0.032) (0.043) (0.032)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
Panel B: Worked HH
Sch Areas × 1 PESA Election -0.030 0.527*** -0.451*** -0.189***
(0.051) (0.100) (0.100) (0.069)
Sch Areas × 2 PESA Elections -0.170*** 0.022 -0.141*** -0.176***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.041) (0.052)
Sch Areas × 3 PESA Elections 0.095*** 0.201*** 0.144*** -0.022
(0.029) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
Panel C: Workdays
Sch Areas × 1 PESA Election -0.122* 0.514*** -0.586*** -0.232***
(0.070) (0.147) (0.165) (0.090)
Sch Areas × 2 PESA Elections -0.208*** 0.014 -0.244*** -0.190**
(0.072) (0.081) (0.084) (0.092)
Sch Areas × 3 PESA Elections 0.103** 0.269*** 0.264*** -0.071
(0.046) (0.057) (0.068) (0.059)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
A53
E.2 ST Plurality Information
Table A29 shows the broad coverage of the data in terms of ST plurality status and being
declared a Scheduled Area.
Table A29: Number of Villages (and Gram Panchayats) and ST Share
Panel A: Number of Observations
Scheduled Areas Non-Scheduled Areas
ST Plurality 8,686 (3,786) 8,954 (4,096)
ST Non-Plurality 5,580 (3,371) 9,421 (5,358)
Panel B: Average ST Share
Scheduled Areas Non-Scheduled Areas
ST Plurality 0.85 0.83
ST Non-Plurality 0.16 0.13
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Table A30: Treatment Eﬀects by ST Majority (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas 0.006 0.034 -0.055 -0.074**
(0.018) (0.031) (0.046) (0.036)
ST Non-Majority 0.008 0.235*** -0.059 -0.102***
(0.021) (0.039) (0.043) (0.035)
Scheduled × ST Non-Majority -0.012 0.373*** 0.037 -0.053
(0.022) (0.044) (0.049) (0.040)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
Panel B: Worked HH
Scheduled Areas 0.007 0.058 0.002 -0.060
(0.028) (0.037) (0.044) (0.040)
ST Non-Majority -0.060 0.115** -0.066 -0.172***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
Scheduled × ST Non-Majority 0.005 0.314*** -0.039 -0.055
(0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas 0.011 0.051 0.056 -0.074
(0.044) (0.054) (0.074) (0.061)
ST Non-Majority -0.083 0.265*** -0.133* -0.270***
(0.062) (0.073) (0.075) (0.069)
Scheduled × ST Non-Majority -0.045 0.408*** -0.101 -0.109
(0.059) (0.077) (0.082) (0.072)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+ x3 + y3 + x2y+ xy2. ST Non-Majority defined as less than 50% of the village population share.
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E.3 AC-level Reservations
Table A31: Controlling for ST Quota in Assembly Constituency (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total ST SC Non-SC/ST
Panel A: Job Cards
Scheduled Areas -0.020 0.136*** -0.031 -0.087***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024)
AC Reserved, ST 0.194*** 0.673*** -0.065* -0.109***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas -0.034 0.128*** -0.024 -0.093***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
AC Reserved, ST 0.413*** 0.719*** 0.069** 0.067*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.070** 0.129*** -0.002 -0.139***
(0.035) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046)
AC Reserved, ST 0.582*** 1.071*** 0.111* 0.135***
(0.038) (0.048) (0.058) (0.050)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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Table A32: Assembly Constituency SC Reservation Analysis (10 km RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas -0.008 0.183*** -0.019 -0.108***
(0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025)
AC Reserved, SC -0.103*** -0.293*** 0.151** -0.119***
(0.026) (0.067) (0.063) (0.037)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, SC 0.128** 0.329*** -0.420*** 0.136
(0.054) (0.120) (0.155) (0.116)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas -0.001 0.192*** 0.002 -0.098***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
AC Reserved, SC -0.154*** -0.230*** 0.174** -0.157**
(0.058) (0.080) (0.081) (0.064)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, SC 0.081 0.019 -0.353** 0.150
(0.105) (0.145) (0.176) (0.165)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.029 0.222*** 0.028 -0.147***
(0.036) (0.047) (0.054) (0.046)
AC Reserved, SC -0.278*** -0.380*** 0.166 -0.298***
(0.090) (0.128) (0.128) (0.098)
Scheduled X AC Reserved, SC 0.199 0.003 -0.386 0.270
(0.149) (0.222) (0.285) (0.222)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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E.4 Robustness of Employment Eﬀects: Census 2011
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Figure A13: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on Employment (Census 2011). This
figure plots results from a Geographic RD model with various control functions in latitudes
and longitudes, as well as bandwidth. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat
(GP) level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion and state
fixed eﬀects. Main workers are those employed more than 183 years in the previous year,
while Marginal Workers are those employed less than 183 days.
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E.5 Eﬀects on Public Goods: 2011 Census
E.5.1 Controlling for Baseline Values
Figure A14: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on Public Goods (Census 2011).
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Notes : Bottom panel replicates top panel results controlling for 2001 baseline values (subject
to data availability).
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Figure A15: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on Public Goods (Census 2011). This
figure plots results from a Geographic RD model with a cubic control function in latitudes
and longitudes, and a 10 km bandwidth as discussed in the text. Standard errors are clustered
at the gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village
proportion and state fixed eﬀects.
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E.5.2 Regression Analyses
Table A33: Eﬀects on Roads (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Roads National State Major Other All
Index Highway Highway District District Weather Gravel
Scheduled Areas 0.030*** 0.013 0.025 0.031 0.036* 0.028* 0.045***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012)
Control Mean 0.487 0.084 0.179 0.392 0.615 0.782 0.868
# GPs 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
Table A34: Eﬀects on Water (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water Hand Tap Water Tank/Pond Covered Uncovered
Index Pump Treated /Lake Well Well
Scheduled Areas 0.014* 0.012 0.016 0.019 0.012 0.012
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)
Control Mean 0.529 0.890 0.302 0.492 0.165 0.794
# GPs 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
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Table A35: Eﬀects on Irrigation (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3)
Irrigation Tube-well/ River/
Index Borehole Canal
Scheduled Areas -0.022 -0.020 -0.025
(0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
Control Mean 0.390 0.415 0.365
# GPs 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
Table A36: Eﬀects on Electricity (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Electricity Agri Domestic Commercial
Index Use Use Use
Scheduled Areas -0.009 -0.011 0.006 -0.021
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Control Mean 0.699 0.673 0.850 0.574
# GPs 2223 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
Table A37: Eﬀects on Communications (10 km RD, Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Communications Post- Post/Telegraph Mobile
Index Oﬃce Oﬃce Telephone Coverage
Scheduled Areas 0.051*** 0.063*** 0.021 0.052*** 0.066***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Control Mean 0.460 0.326 0.238 0.528 0.748
# GPs 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
A62
Table A38: Eﬀects on Education (10 km RD, Shrug Census 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Primary Middle Secondary Senior Sec
Index School School School School College
Scheduled Areas 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.025 -0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007)
Control Mean 0.475 0.901 0.744 0.450 0.246 0.032
# GPs 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
# Villages 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749 2749
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2. The index in the first column is a standardized mean of the other variables.
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F Alternative Explanations
F.1 Data Manipulation and Collusion
One concern with the results is that that politicians can steal funds earmarked for NREGS
by convincing bureaucrats to report workdays for “ghost workers” who only exist on paper
Bhatia and Dreze (2006). Importantly, the concern for the present paper is that this ten-
dency might exist diﬀerentially more for Scheduled Areas. One validated way to measure
manipulation of oﬃcial data is to consider the distribution of digits in that data. The idea
is that the distribution in naturally-occurring data should follow certain patterns, such as
the well known Benford’s law. These procedures have been adopted to study, for instance,
the presence of fraud and electoral manipulation (Beber and Scacco (2012)).
For our purposes, what matters less is whether there exists fraud in NREGS data – many
accounts say that there is – but, whether fraud is more or less likely to exist in Scheduled
Areas. Thus, we focus not on how far the oﬃcial data reported is from the “correct”
distribution of numbers, but rather on whether the distribution of digits varies significantly
between Scheduled and non-Scheduled Areas. This approach is particularly desirable because
detecting data manipulation does not demand that we rely on further human-generated audit
data.
To conduct our analysis, we consider if the deposits data in NREGS is more likely to
end with a 0 in Scheduled Areas than in non-Scheduled Areas.40 Deposits end in 0 in
approximately 21% of oﬃcial data in non-Scheduled Areas, but we do not find that this
percentage diﬀers across non-Scheduled and Scheduled Areas, allaying potential concerns
about diﬀerential data manipulation.
As a secondary test, in Appendix Table A40, we evaluate whether the ratio of workdays
to deposits varies by Scheduled Areas (column 1). We find a negligible 2 percentage point
40Previous work has shown that the distribution of manipulated data often bunches at 0
(Best et al. (2015)).
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diﬀerence (relative to a control mean of 81.8 percent). In column 2, we also test if deposits
data are missing diﬀerently by treatment and do not find evidence that this is the case.
Table A39: Random Digit Test
(1)
Amount Disbursed Ending in 0
Scheduled Areas 0.011
(0.009)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 0.216
# GPs 13338
# Villages 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Outcome is whether the deposit data in NREGS ends
in 0. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP) level. Controls include all baseline
indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a flexible function in village centroid
longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
Table A40: Missingness in Deposits
(1) (2)
Workdays to Disbursements Missing Obs in
Ratio Disbursments
Scheduled Areas -0.020*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.818 0.133
# GPs 11142 13338
# Villages 28616 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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F.2 Distance from the Center
Scheduled Areas are more rural and may be less reliant on centralized government than
non-Scheduled Areas. Because NREGS implementation is primarily determined at the local
level, diﬀerences in reliance on centralized government – rather than quotas – may be driving
our observed eﬀects. To evaluate this possibility, we control for each village’s distance to the
most populous area in our data and find in Table A41 that our results are unchanged.
Table A41: The Eﬀect of Scheduled Areas on NREGS (10 km RD),
Controlling for Distance from Block Center
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total STs SCs Non-SCs/STs
Panel A: Jobcards
Scheduled Areas -0.001 0.197*** -0.039 -0.100***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 652.979 259.373 92.768 300.838
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel B: Households Worked
Scheduled Areas 0.010 0.196*** -0.014 -0.083***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 220.579 98.339 29.806 92.435
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Panel C: Workdays
Scheduled Areas -0.006 0.232*** 0.014 -0.119***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.053) (0.045)
Control Mean (Unlogged) 9748.164 4306.585 1259.986 4181.593
# GPs 13338 13338 13338 13338
# Villages 32641 32641 32641 32641
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the gram panchayat (GP)
level. Controls include all baseline indices, ST and SC village proportion, state fixed eﬀects, and a
flexible function in village centroid longitudes (x) and latitudes (y) of the form: x + y + x2 + y2 +
xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2. Finally, these regressions also control for each village’s distance from its
block’s most populous village.
A66
G Constructing Census Indices
Due to the large number of variables found in the 2001 Indian census (203 total variables
across the Socio-Demographic module and the Infrastructure module), we decided to combine
the individual census variables into indices. Where possible, we generated these indices
using the Indian Census’ variable groupings - for instance, the Education Index combines
10 variables listed in the census in a group which all refer to diﬀerent measures of school
and college facilities. However, we note that the titles we assign to indices – for example,
“Banking Index”, should be taken as suggestive. Each index is constructed according to
the following steps and following: first, we standardize and center each constituent variable.
Second, we assign missing variable values the treatment group mean if at least one index
component is non-missing for that observation. Third, we standardize each variable to the
control group mean and standard deviation. Fourth, we take as our index value the average
of all the constituent variable values (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007).
We list each census’ variable included in each index below. Note while the vast majority
of census variables are binary or counts, additional variables provide additional qualitative
information when village data was unavailable (known as ‘range codes’) – we omit these
non-numerical variables for simplicity.
We also present analyses using 2011 Census data in Table 3, in Figures 4, A13, and A15,
and in Appendix E.5. The data at our disposal for the 2011 Census did not always match
exactly the data for the 2001 Census. Accordingly, below, we note which variables we had
for which Censuses, as well as the cases when it was necessary to recode variables (typically,
to be binary) so that we could match data across the two Censuses.
Socio-Demographic and Economic Module of 2001 Census, and 2011 Indian
Census
Key:
* = In data for 2001 Census only, ** = In data for 2011 Census only.
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• Population Index
TOT NM HH - Total number of households
TOT POP - Total population
M POP - Male population
F POP - Female population
• Vulnerability Index
TOT L6 - Total pop below 6 years
F L6 - Female pop below 6 years
TOT ILLT - Total Illiterates
F ILLT - Female Illiterates
TOT NNW - Total Non-workers
F NNW - Female Non-workers
• Minority Index
TOT SC - Total scheduled caste
M SC - Male scheduled caste
F SC - Female scheduled caste
TOT ST - Total scheduled tribe
M ST - Male scheduled tribe
F ST - Female scheduled tribe
• Agricultural Worker Index
TOT CULT - Total Cultivators
M CULT - Male Cultivators
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F CULT - Female Cultivators
TOT AGLB - Total Agricultural Labourers
M AGLB - Male Agricultural Labourers
F AGLB - Female Agricultural Labourers
T MRG CULT - Total Marginal workers as cultivators
M MRG CULT - Male Marginal workers as cultivators
F MRG CULT - Female Marginal workers as cultivators
T MRG AGLB - Total Marginal workers as agricultural labourers
M MRG AGLB - Male Marginal workers as agricultural labourers
F MRG AGLB - Female Marginal workers as agricultural labourers
• Non-Agricultural Worker Index
TOT MFHH - Total Household industry workers
M MFHH - Male Household industry workers
F MFHH - Female Household industry workers
TOT OTH W - Total other workers
M OTH W - Male other workers
F OTH W - Female other workers
T MRG HH - Total Marginal workers household industry workers
M MRG HH - Male Marginal workers household industry workers
F MRG HH - Female Marginal workers household industry workers
T MRG OTH - Total Marginal workers as other workers
M MRG OTH - Male Marginal workers as other workers
F MRG OTH - Female Marginal workers as other workers
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• Marginal Worker Index
TOT MRW - Total Marginal workers other workers
M MRW - Male Marginal workers other workers
F MRW - Female Marginal workers other workers
Infrastructure and Amenities Module of 2001 Indian Census, and Market
Villages Data for 2011 Census
• Education Index*
EDU FAC - Educational facilities (binary)*
P SCH - Number of Primary School*
M SCH - Number of Senior Secondary School*
S SCH - Number of Secondary School*
S S SCH - Number of Senior Secondary School*
COLLEGE - Number of Collage*
IND SCH - Number of Industrial School*
TR SCH - Number of Training School*
ADLT LT CT - Number of Adult literacy Class/Centre*
OTH SCH - Number of Other educational facilities*
• Medical Facilities Index*
MEDI FAC - Medical facilities (binary)*
ALL HOSP - Allopathic hospital, Maternity and Child Welfare Centre and Primary
Health Centre*
AYU HOSP - Number of Allopathic Hospital*
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UN HOSP - Number of Unani Hospital*
HOM HOSP - Number of Homeopathic Hospital*
ALL DISP - Number of Allopathic Dispensary*
AYU DISP - Number of Ayurvedic Dispensary*
UN DISP - Number of Unani Dispensary*
HOM DISP - Number of Homeopathic Dispensary*
MCW CNTR - Number of Maternity and Child Welfare Centre*
M HOME - Number of Maternity Home*
CWC - Number of Child Welfare Centre Number of Health Centre*
H CNTR - Number of Health Centre*
PH CNTR - Number of Primary Health Centre*
PHS CNT - Number of Primary Health Sub Centre*
FWC CNTR - Number of Family Welfare Centre Number of T.B. Clinic*
TB CLN - Number of T.B. Clinic*
N HOME - Number of Nursing Home*
RMP - Number of Registered Private Medical Practitioners*
SMP - Number of Subsidized Medical Practitioners*
CHW - Number of Community Health workers*
OTH CNTR - Number of Other medical facilities*
• Water Index
HDP ST - Hand Pump (HP)
SPR ST - Spring (S)
TPL ST - Tank/Pond/Lake
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TWT ST - Tap Water (Treated)
TUBEWELL - Tubewell Water (TW)
WELL - Well Water (W) (2011 covered/uncovered well variables combined)
DRNK WAT F - Drinking Water facility (binary)*
RIVER - River Water(R)*
OTHER - Other drinking water sources (O)*
TANK - Tank Water (TK)*
TWU ST - Tap Water (Untreated) **
WAT BOM - Water Bounded Macadam**
• Communications Index
BS FAC - Bus services (2011 Census private/public bus services variables com-
bined)
NAV WRC - Navigable water way including River, Canal etc. (2001 recoded to
Y/N)
PO ST - Number of Post Oﬃce (2001 recoded to Y/N)
PT OF ST - Number of Post and Telegraph Oﬃce (2001 recoded to Y/N)
RS FAC - Railways services
TEL ST - Number of Telephone connections (2001 recoded to Y/N)
COMM FAC - Communication*
P T FAC - Post, Telegraph and Telephone facilities (binary)*
TELE OFF - Number of Telegraph Oﬃce*
AUT MODA - Auto/Modified Autos**
INC CSC - Internet Cafes / Common Service Centre (CSC)**
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MOB PH CV - Mobile Phone Coverage**
RAIL STAT - Railway Station**
SRF SERV - Sea/River/Ferry Service**
SPO ST - Sub Post Oﬃce**
VANS ST - Vans**
• Banking Index
AGRI CRSO - Number of Agricultural Credit Societies (2001 recoded to Y/N)
COOP BANK - Number of Agricultural Credit Societies (2001 recoded to Y/N)
ST AU FAC - Number of Stadium/Auditorium
BANK FAC - Banking facility (binary)*
COMM BANK - Number of Cooperative Commercial Banks*
CRSOC FAC - Credit Societies (Y/N)*
C V HALL - Number of Cinema/Video-hall*
NAC SOC - Number of Non Agricultural Credit Societies*
OTHER SOC - Number of Other Credit Societies*
RC FAC - Recreational and Cultural facilities (binary)*
SP CL FAC - Number of Sports Club*
ATM ST - ATM**
• Road Index
ALL WE RD - Approach - Paved (all weather) Road (2001 recoded to Y/N)
APP FP - Approach - Foot Path*
APP MR - Approach - Mud Road*
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APP NAVCAN - Approach - Navigable Canal*
APP NAVRIV - Approach - Navigable River*
APP NW - Approach - Navigable water-way other than river or Canal*
GRA KU RD - Gravel (kuchha) Roads**
NH ST - National Highway**
MDR ST - Major District Road**
OTH DR - Other District Road**
SH ST - State Highway**
• Urbanization Index
POW SAU - Electricity of Agricultural use (2001 recoded to Y/N)
POW SDU - Electricity for Domestic use (2001 recoded to Y/N)
PAP MAG - Newspaper/Magazine (binary)*
POWER ALL - Electricity for all purposes*
POWER OTH - Electricity of other purposes*
POWER SUPL - Power supply (binary)*
A INCEXP - Separate figures available (Y/N). If Yes:*
TOT EXP - Total Expenditure*
TOT INC - Total Income*
POW SCU - Power Supply For Commercial Use**
• Irrigation Index
RIC ST - River/Canal (2001 canal, river variables combined, recoded to Y/N)
TWB ST - Tube well/borehole (2001 tubewell variables combined, recoded to Y/N)
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CULT WASTE - Culturable waste (including gauchar and groves)*
LAND FORES - Forest Irrigated (by source)*
LAKE IRR - Lake*
TANK IRR - Tank*
OTH IRR - Others [Water source]*
W FALL - Waterfall*
WELL WO EL - Well (without electricity)*
WELL W EL - Well (with electricity)*
TOT IRR - Total Irrigated Area*
UN IRR - Unirrigated Area*
AREA NA CU - Area not available for cultivation*
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